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1. Introduction 
 
Terry Cannon 
NRI 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
This literature survey is part of a policy research project on Rural Non-Farm 
Economy (RNFE) in developing and transition economies. It is being 
conducted by the Natural Resources Institute (NRI) and associates on behalf 
of the UK Department for International Development (DFID), as part of DFID 
collaboration with the World Bank’s Rural Development Department. The 
project is intended to assist the formulation of pro-poor polices relating to the 
RNFE and livelihoods, initially in the case study countries. It has three 
components: one has a regional focus on transition economies of Eastern and 
Central Europe; the other two are concerned with developing economies and 
are focused on the RNFE in relation to peoples’ access and barriers to entry 
(the Access component), and in relation to local governance (the Local 
Governance component). These last two components are closely related, and 
are working in the same case study countries (Uganda, and two states in 
India).  
 
Much of the work in developing countries is concerned with fieldwork in these 
case study countries, but in addition some more generic studies have been 
produced. These include a paper on ‘Policy and Research on the Rural Non-
Farm Economy: a review of conceptual, methodological and practical issues’ 
(Marsland et al, NRI, November 2000), and this literature survey, which 
reviews existing knowledge of the RNFE in relation to governance issues. 
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Local governance and the RNFE 
Governance, as defined by the World Bank in its 1992 report, Governance 
and Development, is: “the manner in which power is exercised in the 
management of a country’s economic and social resources for development.” 
It involves much more than government alone, as suggested by Czempiel: 
“Government is the capacity to get things done with authority; governance is 
the capacity to get them done”. (1992, p.250, cited in Hawthorne 1993, IDS 
Bulletin, p.24). This means that governance includes not only the operation of 
formally-constituted government, but also other forms of power which are 
exercised through the private sector, non-government organisations, civil 
society generally, and by political actors in combination with these entities. 
These can be referred to as non-constituted forms of power. In the 
organisation of work for this project a pragmatic separation has been made 
between on one hand formally-constituted power, and on the other, structures 
and processes involving non-constituted power. The first involves formal 
government action and policy, and the relationship of government at national 
and local level (including decentralisation) to the RNFE. The latter involves all 
other potential sources of influences on the RNFE through the impact of other 
power systems.  
 
The relationship between governance and the RNFE, including the potential 
for benefits in the RNFE of decentralisation was one of the areas of 
knowledge that it was considered needs improvement at a meeting at the 
Bank in June 1999 (www.worldbank.org/research/rural/workshop.htm). This component 
of the project is designed to produce a significant enhancement of knowledge 
of the relationship between the RNFE and local governance, and the types of 
policy interventions (including, where relevant, decentralisation) that can have 
positive impacts on non-farm employment and other livelihoods. In many parts 
of the world, the agricultural sector is unable to absorb more rural labour, and 
migration to towns and cities may have undesirable effects.  
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So an understanding of the optimum form of local governance for a rapid 
expansion of sustainable rural (especially non-agricultural) livelihoods is 
crucial to the reduction of poverty among the rural population. The research 
aims to identify policy interventions that will enable the promotion of good 
local governance, such that the RNFE is enhanced for the benefit of the rural 
poor and without detriment to farming-based livelihoods, or negative impacts 
on other sections of poor people, or on gender relations, or on the 
environment. 
 
The Local Governance component is focused on the district level, and on 
small towns in rural areas. It operates at the meso-level, and complements the 
Access component, which is focused on the micro-level (including enterprises 
and firms) and households. The case study research is focused on two 
themes: the general relationship between local governance and the RNFE, 
and the significance of decentralisation for the RNFE. Each of these involves 
the following research questions and work plan: 
 
The Relationship between Local Governance and the RNFE 
This involves identifying and evaluating direct and specific linkages between 
existing RNFE activities and institutions of local governance. The balance 
between the involvement of constituted authority and other types of 
governance needs to be understood, and their significance for RNFE 
assessed. An evaluation of the possible lack of significance of linkages 
between RNFE and governance is also needed, in order to assess the degree 
of autonomy of economic activities and their relationship to governance. The 
significance of small towns as potential ‘promoters’ of the RNFE needs 
evaluating, so as to evaluate if success is related to scale and spatial-
economic functions rather than governance. 
 
The principal research activities are: 
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a) To evaluate the constraints on the emergence and growth of Micro, 
small and medium enterprises (MSMEs).  
b) To evaluate the impact and effectiveness of local government services, 
including infrastructure, and those measures introduced to promote 
enterprise activity and job creation; 
c) To assess whether the policy and institutional environment is an 
enabling one for employment creation and enterprise growth 
d) To assess the effectiveness of government services; 
e) To analyse the location of enterprise activity, to shed light on the 
significance of small towns, and the potential of industry clusters 
f) To evaluate the possible lack of significance of linkages between RNFE 
and governance, to assess the level of autonomy of economic activities 
and whether they are related to governance. 
 
From this general analysis, the case studies examine the individual functions 
undertaken by the public sector in a district or locality in support of the RNFE. 
They identify and assess the functions provided by local government, 
including: 
· Planning and Development - providing retail and business locations, 
local markets and industrial sites, and local co-ordination and facilitation of 
provision of services. 
· Public service support and infrastructure provision. Local government is 
usually of key importance in support of public services of health and 
education, again of critical importance in the RNFE. Infrastructure 
provision, such as the maintenance of local roads to allow access to and 
from the rural areas for marketing goods and services, has been 
demonstrated to be of mixed significance, linked to both positive and 
negative outcomes for RNFE. 
· Ways in which local government supports civil society initiatives, 
including NGOs, in promoting the development of the RNFE and 
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community participation at the local level. Also co-ordination of local 
economic development programmes involving both public and private 
sectors, promoting partnerships between local government, the public and 
private sectors.  
· The funding of local government and revenue generation is a 
determining function of local government. It involves sourcing of funding 
for development from government, the private sector and from donors. It 
also involves the local taxation and revenue generation that will have a key 
influence on the services provided and determine which sectors benefit 
from services.  
 
Effects of decentralisation policies on the RNFE 
Key issues influencing the success or failure of government decentralisation 
initiatives and policies with reference to the RNFE need to be identified. Many 
studies have shown significant problems in realising the benefits of 
decentralisation in general. Better understanding is needed of the conditions 
which enable the benefits of decentralisation for the RNFE to be realised in 
particular.  
 
Decentralisation on its own may not increase democracy or improve 
conditions for poor people, but rather the reverse if decentralised power is 
captured by local elites. This capture effect may also cause the distributional 
impact of decentralisation to be uneven, with commercial agro-interests, large-
scale farmers, or urban-based interests being able to exert disproportionate 
influence over local government. The impact of such influence or capture on 
the overall welfare of the rural poor (in terms of income distribution, the 
development of additional livelihoods) needs to be understood. 
 
Effective government decentralisation may need to be accompanied by a 
transfer of certain taxation and revenue-generating powers to local 
government, although there are significant resource mobilisation and 
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allocation issues arising from this. Greater regional and inter-district 
inequalities can result from fiscal decentralisation, and fraud and control 
issues at the local level also become more significant. Capacity-building of 
local government, in terms of both structures and personnel, is a necessary 
component of decentralisation processes. The issue of how ‘public 
entrepreneurship’ and leadership skills can be promoted within local 
government and civil society must be analysed.  
 
Key questions for research include: 
· What mechanisms can be introduced that ensure both transparency 
and accountability in the context of a strengthened and expanded local 
government? 
· Which types of decentralisation processes, and associated systems of 
checks and controls, help ensure that the RNFE (and in particular the 
participation of the poor in the RNFE) benefits, and that local elites or the 
commercial agriculture sector do not capture the resulting benefits? 
· What is the revised role of the private sector and of civil society in the 
provision of services to the RNFE in partnership with local government? 
· What is the revised role of central government in the context of 
decentralisation, with particular reference to regional inequalities in public 
expenditure/revenue needs? 
 
These background issues have been described in some depth because we 
consider it significant that very little of the literature on RNFE is directly 
concerned with many of these issues. As will be seen below, there is a 
reasonable literature on decentralisation, but this is not specific to issues of 
the RNFE. Furthermore, the literature on governance, including tha t 
specifically on local governance, is also rarely concerned with economic 
issues. It is rather more focused on problems of participation, representation, 
efficiency of administration, and democracy. It rarely seems to consider what 
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the connections are or might be between improved governance and enhanced 
economic conditions. Rather, much of the literature seems to make a fairly 
simplistic assumption that good governance will enable proper participation 
and representation by previously under-represented groups, so that for 
example poverty will be better addressed. We hope that this literature survey 
is of value for highlighting this deficiency and that this project may be able to 
highlight key linkages for policy design in regard to the RNFE. 
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2. LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND THE RURAL NON-FARM ECONOMY 
 
Nandini Dasgupta 
NRI 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
It is widely acknowledged that increased food security and sustainable natural 
resources management are not sufficient conditions for reducing rural poverty. 
Diversification of livelihoods and non-farm income are important to poor 
households. Most donor agencies accept the role of the RNFE in poverty 
reduction. Among these, the World Bank and the UK government’s 
Department for International Development (DFID) have also embraced ‘good 
governance’ as a principle mechanism for empowering the poor and reducing 
poverty, but without any clear analysis of the mechanisms through which good 
governance (including decentralisation) might relate to economic 
development.  
 
The aim of this review is to synthesise existing knowledge and inform 
research priorities and the design of country studies, and to assist in policy 
design in relation to governance issues relevant for RNFE. Unlike the Access 
component of the project, which can build on a wide-range of existing 
research on ‘access’ issues that are relevant to the RNFE, most of the 
existing literature on the RNFE or on Governance does not make the link 
between role of local governance and the RNFE. The objectives here in the 
first section are:  
(a) To review knowledge on decentralisation, local government and civil 
society institutions, and their implications for improved local governance;  
(b) To examine the extent local governance has contributed to local 
development and poverty alleviation; 
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(c) To draw out the implications for policy development which targets the 
RNFE; 
(d) To analyse thinking on both distress diversification and positive 
diversification and the implications for local governance issues; 
(e) To examine factors that affect incentives and capacity for non-farm 
activities, including public services and infrastructure provision, and any 
positive or negative outcomes for the RNFE; 
(f) To examine issues of linkages between the RNFE and agriculture and 
rural development in the broader sense, and reflect on the implications for 
local governance; 
(g) To consider the significance of non-constituted governance and 
institutions in regard to non-farm rural livelihoods. 
 
Before reviewing the wider issues of governance, local development and 
poverty alleviation, it is useful to define the underlying notions of participation, 
power and empowerment, particularly in the context of the RNFE. Section 1 
(Dasgupta) will discuss these concepts and distinguish between ‘governance’ 
and ‘government’.  Decentralisation is often thought to contribute to improved 
local governance, and the form of local government depends on the 
decentralisation policy of the central government. This largely influences the 
remit of functions of local government and its ability to deliver services and to 
implement development projects, including those that may assist the poor. 
Section 1briefly examines issues of decentralization, though as will be seen, 
this literature hardly relates to the RNFE at all. Good local governance means 
participation by the weaker community groups to help identify and to articulate 
their needs. This, together with accountability, is a necessary ingredient for 
pro-poor development, and is discussed in Section 1. Section 1 examines the 
role civil society institutions have played in rural development in general, and 
in the RNFE in particular. Section 1 examines the role of local governance in 
stimulating economic growth, employment and poverty reduction.  
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Concepts and categories of analysis  
In this section, we examine some of the conceptual frameworks and 
categories used by various authors that are of relevance to our understanding 
of local governance and the RNFE. Some are of wider use in relation to 
development studies, some are specific to governance and some to the 
RNFE. The need to understand the link between development and 
governance is relatively recent. Until the 1980s, notions of powerful, 
centralised government dominated much of development thinking. Pursuit of 
Keynesian principles in managing some Western economies resulted in 
impressive gains (in both growth and welfare) in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Centralisation and creation of welfare states proved popular in the communist 
countries. In their own way, both models influenced many post-independence 
Third World governments in their form of government and the assumed 
connection with the need to provide state direction to the economy. The call 
for strong central government also received support from political scientists 
who argued that a strong state was needed to push through development in 
the face of perceived ‘traditional’ and ‘feudal’ obstacles (Webster, 1996). If 
economic development could be achieved then empowerment and democratic 
governance would follow.  
 
By the 1980s it had become increasingly clear that the top-down approach 
had failed to reduce poverty and promote development because (i) centralised 
decision-making at the macro-level (national) had failed to reach the micro-
level of villages and hamlets, and had left poor and weaker sections 
unrepresented (Aziz & Arnold: 1996); and (ii) in these localities, people had 
little sense of ownership of projects initiated and designed by central 
government representatives, and were unwilling or unable to sustain them 
(Ayers: 2000; Aziz & Arnold:1996). There was an increasing realisation that 
local governance and empowerment of people at lower levels of society was 
needed to promote development.  
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The 1980s thus saw support among aid-recipients and donor agencies for 
stronger local governance that would be more responsive to the needs and 
priorities of the local population, and provide more effective service-delivery. 
Even so, it has taken time for this to be incorporated into project and 
programme activities. In the early 1990s only 2% of World Bank education 
projects included decentralisation strategies in their design, although by 2000, 
over 50% of projects did so. 
 
The underlying rationale for promoting local governance is that it would 
increase local participation and accountability, which in turn would target 
resources and services to meet needs of the poor and reduce rural poverty. 
This is based on the understanding that (i) local people know far more than 
the central government what problems they face, and how best to solve them, 
and, (ii) local institutions would be better able to identify and articulate local 
needs into development strategies.  
 
The success of decentralization therefore largely depends on the level of 
participation by poor and disadvantaged groups in, and their empowerment 
by, the local political and developmental process. The core concepts here are 
participation, power and empowerment, and alongside this the argument that 
changes in formally-constituted government can bring parallel positive 
changes in local governance. Ideally, decentralization would provide the basic 
level of public sector developmental policy, of devolution and decentralisation, 
and of collective action and involvement by civil society institutions. It is 
therefore pertinent briefly to look  at some of these concepts as they might 
relate to the RNFE.  
 
Participation: 
This has several accumulated meanings.  
(i) Participation as political co-option. This can be illustrated by the 
British experience of the 1960s, when town centres and housing in 
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Britain were being modernised. Participation by local people in new 
plans was made statutory. Councils invited comments, and usually 
asked the public which of the pre-determined options they would prefer 
(Lumb: 1980). In effect local councils determined the basis on which 
people participated, and carried out the exercise only to meet the 
statutory regulations (Wright 1990). 
 
(ii) Participation by people as objects of development: In the 
developing economies, the early post-war growth models under the 
modernisation paradigm sought to transform ‘backward’ subsistence 
peasantry into participants of a ‘modern’ economy and nation state. As 
objects of development they were expected to participate in projects 
through their contribution of labour, cash or kind (Nelson & Wright 
1995). 
 
(iii) Participation as ‘inclusion’: The failure of top-down growth and 
developmental models was in part traced to the alienation of 
beneficiaries. One example is that of projects addressing declining food 
production in Africa (Bryson, 1981). Much research and policy ignored 
women’s farming practices, disregarding their role as the main 
managers of local natural resources. The failure to reach the poor led 
to ideas about greater inclusion of the supposed beneficiaries of 
development policies in their research and design. 
 
(iv) Participation for self-sufficiency: At the 1990 Arusha Conference 
on participation in development some NGOs (having been disillusioned 
by government projects) argued that people should design their own 
income-generating projects and look after their own welfare. 
Participation here meant self-sufficiency as opposed to dependence on 
the state. The World Bank used these arguments to push for reduced 
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state involvement in the provision of services in its structural 
adjustment policies (Nelson and Wright 1995). 
 
(v) Participation and transformation: The shortcomings of 
development at the end of 1980s led to arguments that people should 
be made central to development through economic growth, good 
governance, equity and popular participation. Here, participation 
implies that the poor are a necessary part of national growth and 
development, essential to local decision-making; and that altering 
power relations (gender and equity) should be to their advantage.   
 
The shift in emphasis towards various forms of participation gave rise to new 
analyses of deve lopment policies and techniques of qualitative evaluation. 
One of the more influential analyses was by the World Bank (1994). It 
introduced the idea of stakeholders, and defined participation as 
transformative (getting communities to decide their own priorities). 
Participation was ‘a process through which stakeholders influence and share 
control over development initiatives, decisions and resources which affect 
them’ (Ibid). 
 
Chambers (1995) argues that along with recognition of many failures of 
development, and the preoccupation with sustainability, there has been a 
‘deeper and pervasive shift in development thinking’. He notes that the big 
shift of the last two decades has been from a professional paradigm centred 
on things, to one centred on people. In theory, this shift entails much change: 
Top-down becomes bottom-up. The uniform becomes diverse, the 
simple complex, the static dynamic and the controllable uncontrollable. 
The future becomes less predictable. The transfer of packages of 
technology is replaced by the presentation of basket of choice… (T)his 
paradigm implies participation as an empowering process, with a shift 
of power to those who are local and poor (Ibid: 33). 
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However, the difficulties in practice arise from the fact that top-down reality 
has changed little. Among bureaucrats the paradigm still remain strong, not 
least because things (bridges, roads) are still needed. Furthermore, 
Chambers notes that ‘normal professionalism’ seeks to centralise, standardise 
and control - tendencies that are contrary to people-centred development. 
Most importantly, participation as an empowering process is threatening to 
some stakeholders, and can led to loss of power and greater diversity. This 
implies that new tensions will emerge which also need managing as part of 
the development process. 
 
It is in this context of a people-centred paradigm that much analysis of the 
RNFE is located. Participatory development is seen as a process where the 
poor and marginalised are the primary stakeholders, needing to have better 
control over their resources and a greater role in the decision-making that 
affects them. This requires very different power relationships between the 
poor and the state and its institutions, and some civil society organisations 
that tend to adopt patronising attitudes need to change. We therefore need to 
gain some appreciation of how power can be conceptualised, to inform the 
analysis of concepts such as participation and governance. 
 
Power and empowerment 
The concept of power is widely debated. Here it is relevant briefly to examine 
the different ways that power is analysed and then look at power relations as 
they exist in relation to the RNFE. Power is experienced in encounters in 
everyday life as part of systems. These include households (gender relations), 
work and livelihoods (production relations, property rights, class and caste, 
impact of the state and/or elites), access to resources and information (class 
and caste systems, welfare and service provision by the state) and wider 
economic relations. How people stand in relation to each other in a system is 
described as ‘power’ (Nelson & Wright 1995). It is a means of representing a 
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relationship and not a thing.  
 
There are different models of power used to analyse different aspects of 
participation and empowerment. The first model is often referred to as the 
‘power to’. This suggests that, like human abilities, power can grow if you work 
at it. The ‘growth’ of one person does not necessarily have a negative impact 
on another. Harstock (1984) describes this as an ‘energy’ definition of power 
that is ever-expanding. Ferguson (1990) developed a very different model of 
power. He argues that power is subjectless and is an apparatus consisting of 
discourse, institutions, actors and flow of events. They interact invisibly, with a 
logic that is only apparent afterwards, to draw in more relations within the 
ambit of the state. Ferguson elaborates on this in the context of Lesotho, 
where despite the fact that many projects failed, the power of the state 
expanded to include previously distant communities. This of course raises 
wider questions of how participatory development is being managed and the 
effect on the realities of the poor and marginalised.  
 
Probably the most widespread conceptualisation of power is the model 
described as ‘power over’. This involves gaining access to ‘political’ decision-
making. Power in this model is conceptualised as something finite within a 
closed system, a fixed quantum which is capable of being redistributed 
between groups through struggle, development or project interventions. 
Rowlands (1992) argues that a hitherto marginalised group of people with an 
expanding sense of its ability to influence their lives will soon encounter 
relations where control has been institutionalised. The challenge is then to 
gain equal status within that framework through the process of development 
so that they have long-term control over resources that affects their lives. 
 
Different power relations can be identified within this model. Dahl (1961) and 
Polsby (1963) note that ‘A has power over B’ when A prevails over B and 
makes B do what he/she would not have otherwise done. Bachrach and 
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Baratz (1971) add a second dimension. They note that often one party creates 
barriers and prevents others from voicing their interests. The conflict is not 
visible and leads to non decision-making. This is described as ‘A affects B in a 
manner contrary to B’s interests’. Lukes (1974) adds a third dimension. The 
interests of the dominant party are taken to be natural, so that there is no 
alternative to the status quo (e.g. caste system). ‘A exercises power over B’ 
by influencing and shaping his wants. The powerful are able to influence and 
shape the perceptions of the powerless for their own benefit. This dimension 
of power is largely exerted through the process of myth-making, information 
control and manipulation of ideology.  
 
Mahajan (1991) and Fisher et al (1997) use this model to delineate the power 
relations in the rural non-farm sector in India: 
 
Dimension 1 – A has power over B: 
The weavers in the handloom sub-sector are well organised, having received 
support from NGOs for collective action and support from the government to 
form co-operatives. Their competitor, the powerloom sub-sector, is also well-
organised. However, the handloom weavers have generally been able to 
influence policy to their advantage, with a resulting loss to the powerloom sub-
sector. 
 
Dimension 2 – A affects B. A prevails on issues raised by B, but also decides 
what issues B may raise or whether B may participate at all. The authors put 
sub-sectors such as handicraft making, carpet weaving, gems and jewellery 
and leather in this category. The representative bodies of these sub-sectors 
are essentially in the hands of large producer-entrepreneurs and traders, who 
account for a major part of the turnover, especially in exports. ‘They form a 
nexus with the politicians and bureaucrats, and the vast number of artisans 
and workers are not involved in any decision making forums.’ (Fisher et al: 
200). An extreme example is welfare schemes for workers being designed in 
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consultation with owners rather than workers.  
 
Dimension 3 – A exercises power over B. 
Making bidi (local cigarettes), stone quarrying and gathering and processing 
of forest produce are encompassed by the third dimension. These sub-sectors 
employ a large number of people, but are essentially controlled by few big 
operators, such as the bidi king and the quarrying and forest contractors. In 
most cases workers in these sub-sectors are among the poorest and are 
highly marginalised. They do not even see a role for themselves in the 
decision-making process and are resigned to their fate. As noted earlier, such 
power relations have been embodied in the caste system, which has ensured 
that the vast majority of workers-producers see themselves as inferior. The 
hold of the caste system is weakening, but similar power relations are being 
manifested in newly formed economic relations such as the contractor-worker.  
 
Understanding from Dimension 3 would imply that to empower these workers, 
the first step would be raising awareness to undo the established 
psychological domination. Many NGOs have been active in these sectors, 
essentially involved in awareness raising and organising collective action. This 
could lead to a shift to Dimension 2, where the workers and producers would 
be heard and their issues and concern included in the local political agenda. 
Changing power relations would be the next stage. This analysis indicates 
that most workers and small producers in the non-farm economy are tied into 
very unequal relations. The power relations found in the non-farm economy 
could be a microcosm of the circumstances and status of rural poor in 
general.  
 
Governance and government 
The concept of governance is widely contested. The World Bank defines 
governance as ‘the manner in which power is exercised in the management of 
a country’s economic and social resources for development’ (World Bank 
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1992). This definition is based on the Bank’s concern with sustainable 
development of projects it helps to finance. It identified three distinct aspects 
of governance: (i) the form of political regime; (ii) the process by which 
authority is exercised in the management of a country’s resources for 
development; and (iii) the capacity of governments to design, formulate and 
implement policies and discharge functions. The first aspect is deemed 
outside the Bank’s mandate.1 Thus, its focus has been on the second and 
third aspects, with an emphasis on improved public sector management, 
capacity-building and increasing institutional accountability and transparency. 
This focus has a ‘supply-side’ bias (Grindle 1997). However, the World Bank 
has made considerable efforts to explore and mainstream participatory 
approaches to the design and implementations of Bank-financed projects. 
 
The OECD’s Development Assistance Committee uses the World Bank’s 
definition of governance and links it with participatory development, human 
rights and democratisation. This means governance is correlated with 
legitimacy of government (degree of democratisation); accountability of 
political and official elements of government (freedom of media, transparent 
decision-making); competence of government to formulate policies and deliver 
services; respect for human rights and rule of law which provides a framework 
for economic and social activity and freedom of participation by civil society 
institutions and the private sector. Good governance by this definition implies 
continuous interactions between state, civil society and the economy to 
enhance local governance and to facilitate development. This broader 
understanding of governance highlights the importance of participation by the 
poor in the planning and development of resources that affect their lives. 
However, by definition the state is still a very important and influential actor, 
as it sets the wider parameters within which the civil society and the private 
sector can or cannot function. It is also a principal provider of hard and soft 
infrastructure. 
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Development practitioners and policy makers have increasingly realised that 
there are limits to what the state might achieve. The role of other institutions in 
local development is being increasingly recognised. As the role of the state is 
rethought, the scope of market-driven activities is increasing. It is increasing 
with deregulation and privatisation and with the growing recognition that the 
state cannot manage the broad range of functions as was thought previously. 
 
The state and market institutions are different from what they were even ten 
years ago. Privatisation and deregulation have opened new areas of service 
delivery previously the ambit of the state. There is also recognition of the 
opportunities of private-public partnership. An interesting development is that 
today governments at all levels are competing for private sector investment. 
Critically this investment is often tied to improved service delivery by the state. 
 
The importance and the role of NGOs have been redefined over the last 15 
years and they are now considered to add to the overall institutional 
capabilities. Uphoff (1993) argues that the strengths and weaknesses of these 
three sets of institutions are complementary and interrelated. Their scope and 
operations have evolved and changed. Perhaps the real challenge to 
improving local governance lies in creating positive synergies among the 
state, market and civil institutions to stimulate growth and alleviate poverty.  
 
Government can be considered as a sub-set of governance that consists of 
formally-constituted power (or, where imposed by force, the de facto  authority 
of a territory or country). Grindle (1997) notes that good government is about 
the quality of human resources, organisations and institutions in the public 
sector. Achieving good government means efforts to develop human 
resources, strengthening organisation and reforms and/or creation of new 
institutions. These three dimensions are interrelated and efforts to improve 
governance means enhancing the efficiency, effectiveness and 
responsiveness of all three aspects. Capacity-building aims to improve, 
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among other things, the efficiency and effectiveness of government. 
Decentralisation and creation of local government institutions are seen as 
means to increase government’s effectiveness and responsiveness to local 
needs and demands. 
 
Strengthening local government is seen as one of the means of improving 
local development. It is essentially an instrument for social and economic 
progress. While development can take place without local government 
institutions, they should help to develop local solutions to local problems. 
Presence of such institutions can facilitate the interaction between the state 
and the primary stakeholders and NGOs and help define local demands and 
resources available. Local resources for social and economic development 
are more easily mobilised if such projects are decided and implemented at the 
local level (Kälin, 2000), and local involvement makes a project more 
sustainable.  
 
Typology of institutions 
Civil society institutions are independent of the state and government. Figure 
1 lists the different types of institutions covered by these two categories (from 
an Indian context). 
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Figure 1 – Typology of Institutions 
 
State and Government Institutions Civil Society Institutions 
Macro 
National Government 
Judiciary 
 
NGOs 
Religious and ethnic associations 
Trade Unions 
Caste Associations 
Micro 
Local Government 
Local Police 
Health Clinics 
Schools 
Extension Workers 
Traditional Authority 
NGOs 
Community-based organisations/ 
Peoples Organisation 
Producer Groups 
Neighbourhoods 
Kinship networks  
Traditional Leaders 
Sacred Sites 
 
Based on Narayan (2000) 
 
Given the context of the study, this review will concentrate on decentralisation 
and local government institutions. A later section looks at micro-level civil 
society institutions and their contributions to rural development in general and 
the RNFE in particular. 
 
Strategies for local development and poverty reduction 
Determining the criteria to assess the contribution of local governance to local 
development and poverty reduction is difficult since little of the literature 
discusses it in such a framework. The literature on poverty reduction suggests 
that three types of strategy are necessary to alleviate poverty. It is also 
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important to achieve a balance between such strategies. The three strategies 
are described as those: 
 
(i) for economic growth that generates increased labour demand, increases 
productivity and strengthen local economic base;  
(ii) to increase human capital-education and health- among the poor; and 
(iii) to put in place social safety nets to protect the vulnerable from destitution. 
 
A review of the literature on governance and government shows that these 
form the stated basis of government plans and programmes in many 
developing countries. These can be categorised as production-oriented 
strategies, and welfare strategies (which subsume (ii) and (iii)). It is important 
to separate the two. Welfare strategies aim to provide amenities and 
undertake public work-oriented projects and emergency aid. Such projects 
tend to focus on health, education and local and community infrastructure. 
These targeted programmes should benefit weaker sections and improve the 
quality of their lives, and may also help overcome barriers to entry to income-
activities. Production-oriented strategies aim to create employment and other 
income generating opportunities and to strengthen the local economic base. 
Such projects can lead to increased production and productivity in farm and 
non-farm sectors. There is potential for income and employment generation 
through the backward and forward linkages of these activities.  
 
The challenge to local governance lies in getting the right policy mix of welfare 
and production strategies. For example, in Sri Lanka the emphasis has been 
on improving the welfare of the poor. Today it scores reasonably well on the 
UN’s Human Development Index, but neglect of production strategies have 
resulted in long-term structural unemployment, low productivity and  low 
economic growth rate. Most research of local government performance on 
poverty alleviation (discussed in the section on p.53) is focused on issues of 
balance between welfare and production strategies at the local level. 
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Decentralisation 
This section looks at issues relating to types of decentralisation; then 
examines the scope of disadvantaged groups to participate in influencing local 
policy making; and discusses the difficulties of incorporating accountability in 
local governance  
 
Although decentralisation policies are used in a number of different countries, 
the concept is rather confused and it is used in a number of different ways in 
different contexts (Conyers: 1985, 1986). Samoff (1990) noted that most 
authors tend to be preoccupied with administrative decentralisation. The 
concern in the development debate and in donor policy is improvement of 
local government performance and implementation of development 
programmes. It is in this context that decentralisation is reviewed. 
 
Rondinelli (1981) distinguished between four different categories of 
decentralisation, which have become widely used: 
(i) deconcentration is defined as transfer of power to local administrative 
offices of the central government. It is also referred to as ‘administrative 
decentralisation’ (Manor: 1999);  
(ii) delegation is the transfer of power to sub-national governments and/or 
parastatals, or other government entities;  
(iii) devolution is the transfer of power to sub-national political entities; and  
(iv) privatisation is the transfer of power to the private sector. 
 
Parker (1995) provides further analytical refinement by distinguishing between 
political, fiscal and institutional decentralisation. Like Parker, Manor (1999) 
excludes privatisation as a form of decentralisation. He argues that 
privatisation often involves a shift of power and resources from one major, 
centralised power to another. However, privatisation and market liberalisation 
implies freeing up small and local businesses to participate in rural 
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development programmes and in service delivery. This is recognition of the 
role that can be played by local actors and that they should be included in the 
decision-making process. Hence, for this review decentralisation has four 
components: 
1. Deconcentration or administrative decentralisation 
2. Devolution or democratic decentralisation  
3. Fiscal decentralisation 
4. Privatisation or economic/market liberalisation. 
 
All these can occur simultaneously or in isolation, and power can be bestowed 
on one or more intermediate levels. Whatever the mix, decision to 
decentralise is political (Parker: 1995; Manor: 1999; World Bank 2000). For 
example, in Latin America, decentralisation has been an essential part of the 
democratisation process after discredited autocratic regimes have been 
replaced by elected governments with new constitutions. In Africa, the spread 
of multi-party political systems is creating demand for more local voice in 
decision-making. The transition economies have undergone decentralisation 
as the old central apparatus crumbled. In East Asia decentralisation appears 
to be motivated by the need to improve service delivery to large populations 
and the recognition of the limitation of central administration (World Bank, 
2000). 
 
Deconcentration is a form of administrative decentralisation where decision-
making remains at the centre, with the other levels of government being 
limited to transmitting orders and implementing decisions. There is limited 
scope for involving local citizens in decision-making. It is considered the 
weakest form of decentralisation and is used most frequently in unitary states.  
The FAO (2000) notes that a majority of countries have not gone beyond this 
point. Deconcentration is given preference as it gives a sense of 
decentralisation without giving away any central powers. Bangladesh is a 
case in point where the emphasis is on administrative decentralisation, with 
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very little political and fiscal devolution (Westergaard, 1995; Khan,1996).  
Thus, deconcentration by itself contributes little to developing local institutions 
or enhancing local governance. 
 
Devolution is ‘the transfer of resources and power to local authorities which 
are largely or wholly independent of higher levels of government and which 
are democratic in some way and to some degree.’ (Manor, 1999: 6). 
Devolution usually transfers responsibilities for services to municipalities that 
elect their own mayors and councils, raise their own revenues and have 
independent authority to make investment decisions. It is expected to 
contribute to the deve lopment of capacity at the local level (World Bank, 
1995). Under a devolved system, local governments would have clear and 
legally defined geographical boundaries over which they exercise authority 
and within which they would perform public functions (World Bank, 2000). 
Basta (2000) summarises the values driving the case for political 
decentralisation. These are an increase in democracy; protection of freedom 
and human rights; increase in efficiency through delegation of responsibility; 
higher quality of services; and enhancement of social and economic 
development.  
 
Political decentralisation is a reversible process. In India, the post-
independence constitution encouraged the establishment of local, self-
governing bodies from villages to the district (panchayat raj) and permitted 
states to support this process. The states of Maharastra and Gujarat 
implemented panchayat raj in the 1960s, but the experiment was so 
successful that they felt threatened by the emergence of new local centres of 
power and terminated the programme (Webster, 1990). The vigour with which 
decentralisation is taken up may depend on the centre-state relations. The 
state governments of West Bengal and Karnataka, governed by parties in 
opposition to central government, wanted to demonstrate that they were more 
imaginative and democratic, and implemented the reforms vigorously. These 
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experiences indicate that scope for local government must be analysed in the 
context of the relationship with the central government.  
 
Fiscal decentralisation: Financial responsibility is a core component of 
decentralisation. If local governments are to carry out their functions they must 
have adequate levels of revenue. Fiscal decentralisation refers to downward 
fiscal transfer, by which higher levels cede influence over budgets and 
financial decisions to lower levels (Manor, 1999). However, Mawhood (1993) 
in reference to the experience in tropical Africa, notes that if fiscal 
responsibility is passed on to deconcentrated bureaucrats who are 
accountable to superiors at higher levels, it can hardly reflect the local needs. 
Furthermore, fiscal decentralisation without political devolution rarely 
increases the influence of organised interests at lower levels.  
 
Fiscal decentralisation can take many forms, including (a) self-financing; (b) 
co-financing or co-production arrangements through which the user 
participates in providing services and infrastructure through monetary or 
labour contributions; (c) expansion of local revenue base and improved 
collection; (d) intergovernmental transfers of revenue from central to local 
governments for specific use; and (e) authorisation of municipal borrowing 
and mobilisation of either national and local governments through loan 
guarantees (World Bank, 2000). 
 
Fiscal decentralisation does not detract from the importance of central 
government distribution policies. Concerns about equity between levels of 
government are central to the discussion of fiscal decentralisation. Some 
jurisdictions may be better endowed with resources than others, perhaps due 
to size or location. Intergovernmental fiscal programmes which transfers 
resources to disadvantaged areas are crucial to reducing regional disparities 
(World Bank, 2000). Central government also has an important role in 
improving interpersonal equity. Local governments are instrumental in 
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implementing central distributional policies and addressing intra-locality issues 
(ibid).  
 
Fiscal decentralisation often allows local governments to mobilise local 
resources through expansion of the tax base. But this instrument is rarely 
used as politicians are disinclined to impose new taxes. According to Manor 
(1995: 84) politicians are ‘specially concerned about taxing prosperous groups 
- those from whom most mobilisable resources would need to be raised - 
since most elected councillors come from such groups and often depend on 
them for re-election’. 
 
Privatisation and economic decentralisation shift responsibilities for functions 
from the public to the private sector. They allow functions that had been 
primarily or exclusively the responsibility of government to be carried out by 
businesses, community groups, co-operatives, NGOs and other voluntary 
organisations. Conceptually, there is a logical connection between 
privatisation and decentralisation, if the primary objective is to reduce the 
control of central state structures over economic decision-making (Aziz & 
Arnold, 1996). Privatisation can include (a) allowing private enterprises to 
perform functions that had been previously carried out by government; (b) 
contracting out management of public services through public-private 
partnerships; (c) financing public sector through capital markets; (d) divesting 
state owned enterprises to the private sector (World Bank, 2000).  
 
Deregulation reduces the legal constraints on private participation in service 
provision or allows competition among private suppliers for services that in the 
past had been provided by the government or by regulated monopolies. 
Privatisation and deregulation are now attractive alterna tives to governments 
in developing countries. Local government are also privatising by contracting 
out service provision or administration (ibid). 
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Decentralisation is essentially a political process and it is pertinent to 
emphasise here that an analysis of local governance has to be informed by 
the political economy of the relevant country. This includes knowledge of 
social structures, established systems of patronage, inherited government 
structures, and regional and ethnic groups’ differential access to power and 
resources attributed to their marginal status in ‘mainstream’ culture. The 
establishment of local government is a political process and one that is 
initiated by the central government. An understanding of the relationships 
between different tiers of local government and the central government is 
essential to understanding these institutions. 
 
Implications for local governance: 
1. Decentralisation, governance and poverty reduction:  
The mix of decentralisation varies nationally and it does not always mean 
improved democracy or poverty reduction. Malaysia has a long history (since 
1971) for governance geared to reduction of poverty and inequity. This has 
been achieved through increasing the efficiency of public agencies rather than 
through democratic decentralisation and participation (Schneider, 1998). On 
the other hand, in Bolivia, the Popular Participation Law promulgated in 1994 
provides municipalities with resources and decision-making powers to 
strengthen social development. However, so far there has been little impact 
on rural poverty as functioning of the system is hampered by, among others, 
illiteracy, difficult transport, absence of transparency and a weak democratic 
culture (Gonzales, 1997).  
 
In the Philippines, the Agrarian Reform Law introduced participatory bodies at 
national, provincial and village levels. In reality, only the council at the national 
level is fully functional. There are no direct links between peasant 
representatives and other levels and capacity building at the local level is still 
a problem (Martinez, 1997). Khan (1996) notes that in Bangladesh it is more a 
case of administrative deconcentration, rather than true devolution of power 
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and autonomy, with little impact on the rural poor.  
 
Further complications arise because decentralisation can ‘entail transfers of 
power to different levels in the political system.’ (Manor, 1999). For example, 
power can be bestowed on a region rather than to the local level. It is 
important to recognise that there is a difference between systems that 
empower intermediate levels and those that empower local levels (ibid). Sri 
Lanka, has a four-tier democratic system with power devolved to Provincial, 
District, Local and grassroots levels. However, more power rests with the 
Provincial councils than with Local and District councils. Thus, project 
identification and decisions for resource allocation are taken at the Provincial 
level. Abeyawardana (1996) concludes that present distribution of power has 
failed to initiate local level planning and grassroots involvement. The World 
Bank (2000) notes that in practice ‘all services do not need to be 
decentralised in the same way or to the same degree’. In other words, 
selective decentralisation of services could address the issue of different 
economies of scale for different types of services.  
 
As stated earlier, governance depends on the type of local government 
institutions, attitude of bureaucrats, and the roles that can be played by the 
voluntary sector, semi-government agencies and the private sector. The part 
that can be played by these organisations are linked to the type and level of 
decentralisation. For example, the extent of privatisation and market 
deregulation determines the role that the private sector can play in service 
delivery and the scope for partnership building. The level of political and fiscal 
decentralisation affects the influence the local government has on the political 
system, and hence on local development activities and poverty alleviation. 
 
2. Local willingness to translate decentralisation into effective governance:  
While there has been some positive experience in Bolivia, Schneider (1998) is 
sceptical of the beneficial effects of decentralisation for the poor. He argues 
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that where local power structure is biased against the poor and/or where the 
local capacities are weak, the quality of service provision form the local 
decentralised level is poorer than from the central level. To change power 
structures takes time and resources. Decentralisation should therefore not be 
considered a quick and cheap way for poverty reduction. 
 
To enable relevant mechanisms to play their role in participatory governance 
the decentralised bureaucrats must be open, facilitating, listening and 
empowering the poor. Chambers (1997) speaks of necessary ‘reversals’ in the 
attitude and behaviours of the ‘uppers’. The normal tendencies of the civil 
servants are to be dominating, lecturing and extracting. To achieve such 
reversal requires innovations in training, formal operational rules and 
incentives related to behaviour and performance. 
 
Participation and accountability in local governance 
Participation and accountability are considered the two cornerstones for 
successful or good local governance. If these are present at the local level 
there will be more effective service delivery for the poor. The review of 
secondary material and country experience indicates that the reality is more 
complex. 
Participation: 
In the poverty context, local democratic governance is expected to identify 
and follow ways in which the poor themselves could contribute to the move 
out of poverty and to enable them to do so. This is to be achieved through 
participation by the poor and greater accountability in the system. Participation 
is expected to increase representation of the targeted constituencies, which in 
turn would empower these groups to influence development activities and 
consequently benefit these groups and alleviate poverty. Blair (2000) in a six-
country2 study (funded by USAID) shows that increase in participation by the 
weaker and disadvantaged groups does not always lead to their needs being 
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articulated into local programmes. Therefore, participation does not 
automatically lead to subsequent reduction in poverty. It is pertinent to look at 
this study in some detail.  
 
The central idea of participation is to give citizens a meaningful role in local 
government decisions that affect them (Blair: ibid). Manor (1995: 82) 
elaborates on the wider meaning of the term. Participation at one level refers 
to electoral participation – both voting and taking part in election campaigns. 
At the second level it refers to participation and involvement in politics 
between elections, such as joining voluntary associations, signing petitions, 
contacting politicians and bureaucrats, taking part in protests. The depth of 
this type of participation tend to vary with the length of a country’s democratic 
experience. In countries with a history of repressive rulers and in former and 
current Leninist regimes, such participation is seriously underdeveloped. But 
in Ghana, Uganda, the Philippines, India and Sri Lanka levels are quite high 
by international standards (ibid). 
 
Blair conceptualises the argument that establishment of local democratic 
governance will ultimately lead to reduction in poverty as a five-stage process. 
With the introduction of local democratic governance, the expectations are 
that: 
Increase in participation leads to 
  > increase in representation 
  > increase in empowerment 
  > increase in benefits for all 
  > decrease in poverty. 
 
He examines each of these stages to see if experience substantiates this 
argument. The act of launching a democratic local government initiative 
ensures a certain degree of participation. Citizens are likely to vote in the local 
elections and would have increased interest in local politics and the political 
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process. Democratic decentralisation means that new constituencies will gain 
representation. This may include the disadvantaged. But it is more likely that 
businessmen (e.g. Ukraine), local notables, large farmers and labour leaders 
will find a place on council. Even if these elite groups have conflicting 
interests, “they are likely to collude in their own material interests than 
compete. If only the elite gain representation then it is unlikely that the wider 
public will be served”. More positive experiences are found in Bolivia and the 
Philippines. In the former, the Quecha and Aymara communities have found 
representation, and the Kalingas and Gaddangs in the latter. In both instances 
the communities are geographically concentrated. In Karnataka, India, it is 
mandatory for a third of the elective representatives to be women. This has 
increased their presence in the local councils. 
 
Blair notes that local governance has delivered only partially on 
empowerment. The ethnic communities in Bolivia have been empowered and 
are now able to invest in local primary schooling and road building. On the 
other hand, in Karnataka, the women have not fared so well. Here the women 
are a ‘front’ for the male members of their households and communities. The 
scheduled castes, widely dispersed disadvantaged communities, either do not 
participate in the local councils or do so only at the behest of their patrons. For 
example, there are still instances where they have been unable to demand 
more equitable siting of water supplies and electricity lines. This is supported 
by Aziz et al (1996: 162). They observe that the “same dominant community-
oriented power structure that obtains in rural Karnataka seem to prevail in the 
mandal governments too”.  
 
Crook & Manor (1998: 10) in an in-depth analysis ‘of impact of democratic 
participation on the performance of decentralised institutions’ in Karnataka 
note that though decentralisation galvanised associational activities among 
the scheduled castes and tribes, they have been unsuccessful in generating 
any substantial benefits for their communities. It would appear that 
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participation and representation are easier to achieve, particularly where 
mandated, but empowerment is significantly difficult to attain. 
 
The degree of empowerment has an impact on distribution of benefits. Blair 
notes that local elite still controls elected councils and have steered benefits to 
themselves. In Ukraine, local businessmen have captured the privatising state 
enterprises through their influence as council members and through bribes. In 
Bolivia, though the ethnic groups have gained, the local council is diverting 
funds to build an automobile racetrack in one of the poorest regions of the 
country. Outside regions where specific communities dominate, the evidence 
is mixed.  
 
Blair concludes that “there is little evidence so far that local governance can 
do much directly to reduce poverty, at least in the short term. The main reason 
for this pessimism is that when governance is decentralised, local elites get 
most of the power and steer benefits to themselves, or at least maintain the 
existing distribution pattern”. 
 
This is supported by wider evidence. In the Philippines, the Local Government 
Code of 1991 devolved significant powers and responsibility to the 
municipality. The Code made it mandatory for the elected council to include 
representatives from poor and disadvantaged groups. Carino (1996: 236) 
following an evaluation of the impact of decentralised governance in the 
Itogon Municipality concludes, “peoples’ empowerment has not been realised 
through the Local Government Code” because “the fundamental structures of 
local politics in Itogon, with its patronage, elite-domination and personality-
orientated elections, has not changed at all”. On the role of NGOs, Carino 
notes NGOs are not effective representatives in local government. 
Participation in governance is not their expertise, and distracts them from their 
primary mission. 
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In Bangladesh, each change in central government has been accompanied by 
changes to the previous system of local government and initiating a new one. 
Westergaard and Alam (1995) observe that while the various governments 
have introduced reforms using the traditional normative arguments of 
democracy and participation, the implicit purpose has been to serve political 
ends. The required level of autonomy has not been built into the process of 
decentralisation. Khan (1996) assesses the extent of popular participation in 
local governance and its impact on the local development. She concludes that 
the structure and functions of the local government neither represent nor 
serve the interests of the poor. The elected members, chairman and 
government functionaries play a dominant role in planning, resource 
mobilisation and allocation.  
 
In Sri Lanka, the lowest level of local government, the Gramodaya Mandalaya 
(GM) is said to have some achievements with respect to the physical 
development of the local area. However, as the Chairpeople of GMs are 
appointed, there are considerable partisan affiliations among member. 
Abeyawardana’s (1996) survey indicates that if the chairperson was elected, 
the council could reflect the needs and aspirations of the villagers. 
 
The experience of these countries raises important questions about social 
capital and participation. Putnam (1993) argued that communities with high 
levels of social capital would organise to demand better government. His 
definition of social capital – as the associational ties built on horizontal cultural 
norms of identity, trust and reciprocity – is widely accepted by donor agencies 
(Bryceson: 1999). This definition implies that family ties and vertical patronage 
networks of trust and reciprocity do not count. Social networks of reciprocity 
(with vertical linkages) are also very strong in rural areas and they generate 
considerable benefits for its members. Though they tend to be more exclusive 
than inclusive, the importance of these networks should not be 
underestimated (Putzel: 1997). 
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The low levels of social capital in rural communities highlights the importance 
of welfare strategies in rural development. It also raises the larger issue of the 
nature of policies that need to be framed for empowering people who are 
prevented from participating in decentralised governance. Reservation of 
seats and mandatory regulations for weaker section provides them with 
access. Kothari (1996: 39) argues that if these persons are not trained in the 
art of governance through the creation of awareness and information 
dissemination, they are no better off than before.  
 
The major challenge to rural development projects would be to understand the 
nature of social capital and to ascertain the level of social capital. This would 
help design training modules for education, skills development, empowering, 
awareness building, and for information dissemination. Improved social capital 
not only enhances participation in the local political processes, equally 
important, it improves access to opportunities for income generation and 
diversification. 
 
Accountability:  
The other most powerful element of good governance in the poverty context is 
accountability (Schneider: 1998).  Both Blair (2000) and Manor (1995) note 
that accountability has to be achieved at two levels: first is between the 
bureaucrats and the elected members, and second is between the politicians 
and the public. Neither type is easy to achieve nor is there a blueprint for 
success. Some of the difficulties to achieve accountability at the two levels are 
discussed here.  
 
With respect to the first, bureaucratic accountability to elected officials, Manor 
(ibid) notes that bureaucrats have little regard for the ‘small fry’ elected in a 
decentralised system.  Even if they overcome their disinclination to work with 
local politicians, they lack the skills to work productively with the politicians. 
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Additionally, accountability is incomplete when employees are decentralised 
but the authority to discipline them still rests with the central authority. For 
example in Bolivia, with decentralisation, local authority has the power to 
supervise health officers, but it cannot discipline them as the central authority 
still controlled their posting, tenure and salary. Mali is the only example where 
significant control over civil servants was transferred to local elected bodies 
(Blair: ibid). 
 
Further difficulties arise, as central government employees often do not wish 
to be decentralised. They believe that this negatively affects their chances of 
promotion, their children’s’ education and their lifestyle through loss of urban 
amenities. In the event that they are moved to lower levels, their desire is to 
please the superior bureaucrats to ensure career progression rather than the 
locally elected politician. In Karnataka after several decades of Panchayat 
Raj, a comprise has been reached: “…elected officials direct civil servants in 
their jurisdiction, while the line ministries write the annual evaluation reports 
that determine promotions and postings” (Blair: ibid).  Although imperfect, the 
arrangement works.  
 
Difficulties also arise from the fact that official notions of performance and 
accountability vary with dominant culture within the public sector. For 
example, if performance refers to meeting targets in terms of numbers, it fails 
to assess the quality of service delivered. Additionally, accountability is to the 
upper tiers in the bureaucracy rather than to the people.   
 
In the second type, it is hard to ensure that politicians remain accountable to 
the voters. National politicians from the same region very often use the heads 
of elected councils as backers. This again raises the question of whether their 
allegiance would be to the voter or to upper tiers. Most decentralised 
democratic systems use a combination of arrangements to incorporate 
accountability. These include regular elections; multi-party political system; a 
LITERATURE SURVEY: RNFE AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE 
 
 39 
strong and lively civil society to ensure social accountability; an open and free 
press with responsibility for making political news public; public meetings to 
insert civic opinion into local governance; and formal grievance procedures.  
 
This review indicates that no two countries have used the same combination 
of mechanism and none have instituted all. Furthermore, no one mechanism 
by itself has proven sufficient to  realise genuine accountability. Regular 
elections have the most potential, but there are serious constraints to free and 
fair elections.  
 
The implication of these difficulties and experience is that there is no single 
solution. The combination of mechanisms and the potential for success 
depends on the area- and situation- specific conditions. For example in 
Venezuela, the World Bank has assisted the government in establishing 
decentralised public agricultural extension service. A major objective was to 
empower farmers to hold extension agents accountable for results. This was 
achieved by decentralising management responsibilities to the local level and 
by allowing public agricultural systems to contract private firms and NGOs to 
deliver extension services. The package of services was offered to farmers on 
a cost-sharing basis (Ayres: 2000).  
 
The success of this project, and the fact that (a) the empowerment of the 
target group remains limited despite political decentralisation; and (b) 
establishing accountability in the system is a long term proposition; indicate 
that rural development projects need to incorporate accountability in project 
design so that service supplier is directly accountable to the recipient. Fox 
(1995) in an analysis of governance and rural development in Mexico 
concludes that policy-specific accountability mechanisms are needed. 
However, in the long term their effectiveness is likely to remain limited without 
system-wide accountability mechanisms. 
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The review so far has indicated that there may have been some increase in 
participation by the local people largely through the election process and the 
mandatory reservation of seats on local councils for women and other 
disadvantaged groups. This however has not always led to empowerment, as 
it has been difficult to dislodge the traditional power structures that continue to 
dominate local councils. As a result, the needs of the poor have not always 
been reflected in the portfolio of resource allocation nor in projects 
undertaken. Also lack of accountability remains a major problem. 
 
 
CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTIONS AND PROVISION OF SUPPORT AND 
SERVICES TO RNFE 
Civil society 
Civil society comprises institutions that are not state affiliated. They occupy 
the space between households and the state (Hyden: 1997). The political 
space available for civil society institutions depends on the national political 
environment. This implies that the evolution of such institutions and their links 
with the state and grassroots has to be understood in the historical, political 
and economic context. Its development is constrained under repressive 
national government. Often the state is not antagonistic to such institutions, 
but bureaucratic government agencies create non-democratic conditions, as 
in Bangladesh (Farrington et al: 1993). Civil institutions have a greater scope 
to develop under conditions of relative democracy. Here the tasks of the civil 
society are to build greater accountability, articulate local demand, increase 
responsiveness of development projects, and address local capacity and/or 
underlying power and justice issues. 
 
Civil society refers to groups, networks and relationships not organised or 
managed by the state. It includes formal and informal links and networks 
(Narayan: 2000). As shown in Figure 1, these include non-governmental 
organisations, community based organisations, neighbourhood networks, 
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trade unions and producer groups and associations. Narayan notes that social 
capital is a useful concept in understanding the role that civil institutions play 
in the lives of the poor. Social capital has been variously defined. As noted in 
the section on p.36, Putnam (1993) defined social capital as associational ties 
built on horizontal cultural norms of identity, trust and reciprocity. To him 
vertical links were not important. Narayan defines it as the norms and 
networks that enable people to co-ordinate collective action. This is a wider 
delineation of the concept. It accepts that sometimes the poor could establish 
vertical ties.  
 
Social capital is more important to the poor than the better off. Given their 
limited access to resources like land, capital and skill, the links and network 
they develop become an important part of their coping strategy. Putnam 
(1993) had argued that communities with high levels of social capital would 
organise to demand better government. This is borne out by subsequent 
studies. Grootaert and Narayan (2000) show that households with higher 
social capital also have higher income and that social capital has a 
disproportionate impact on low-income groups, small landholders than on 
large landholders. Narayan and Cassidy (1999) established associations 
between social capital and social cohesion in Uganda and Ghana. In India, 
Krishna and Uphoff (1999) noted links between watershed management and 
social capital. 
 
A review of civil institutions and their functioning appears to indicate that, 
although links and networks that the poor develop are a major resource, they 
are not sufficient to lift the communities out of poverty. This section discusses 
each of the civil institutions (listed in Figure 1) in the wider context of rural 
development and more specifically the RNFE, to understand the role they play 
under conditions of relative democracy.  
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NGOs in rural development 
Voluntary organisations have been involved with development work long 
before official aid agencies were established (Clark 1991). In South Asia, the 
emergence of rural NGOs in their present form is largely attributed to the poor 
performance of public sector programmes in the 1960s and 70s. Two decades 
of developmental efforts in agriculture and rural development had very limited 
success. Additionally, much of this effort gave priority to more socially-
homogenous areas with well-resourced farmers (e.g. Punjab). Complex, 
diverse and risk prone areas that required different technology and approach 
were allocated low priority. NGOs moved into ‘niche’ areas and sectors at the 
margins of government’s efforts (Farrington et al 1993). However, reasons for 
their emergence vary. For example, in Bangladesh, NGOs emerged following 
the War of Independence in 1972, to support devastated rural communities.  
 
In 1993, Farrington et al undertook a comprehensive study to examine the 
role that NGOs could play in sustainable rural development. The study 
covered Asia, Africa and Latin America. They note that there are three broad 
perceptions of NGOs, all of which view the emergence of NGOs as a positive 
force: 
1. NGOs as a force for democracy: Their involvement at grassroots level 
and activities to mobilise collective action is seen as development with 
democracy (Lehman 1990). They are also seen as providing checks and 
balances and as helping the poor to voice their needs. 
2. NGOs as poverty alleviators and sustainable developers: NGOs strong 
presence in the rural areas is seen as their commitment to poverty 
alleviation.  Their support for establishing mechanisms for grassroots 
action, their small scale and flexibility to respond quickly to the needs are 
all seen as contributing to sustainable development (Clark 1991). 
3. NGOs as efficiency enhancers: The third perspective has been 
concerned with the potential that NGOs offer for enhancing the efficiency of 
service delivery. Broadly, the arguments are (a) the strong presence in 
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rural areas and the detailed knowledge of the needs of the poor allow 
NGOs to deliver more appropriate services more cost effectively than the 
public sector could (World Bank 1991a; 1991b). This view has led to 
substantial increase in funding allocations to NGOs. (b) Innovations 
developed by the NGOs – methodological or institutional – reflect local 
needs and conditions. This led to a call that these should be adopted and 
applied by the public sector on a wider scale. (c) Abed (1991) and Carroll 
(1992) argue that NGOs can influence the public sector agenda through 
formal and informal links. Furthermore, the ‘demand-pull’ can be sustained 
by the gradual take-over of NGO responsibility by the grassroots members 
of the organisation.  
 
These arguments imply high level of expectation from these organisations.  
Indeed they were expected to become the vanguard of civil society and take a 
leading role in ensuring more equitable socio-economic development (Korten 
1990). Tendler (1982) in a study of US NGOs operating in developing 
countries concluded that beneficiaries were often in the middle and upper 
ranges of income distribution. This questioned the rhetoric of working with the 
‘poorest of the poor’. 
 
There were also concerns about the high level of generalisation in pro-NGO 
literature (Farrington 1993). As stated earlier, NGOs can be constrained or 
encouraged by the wider political environment. They operate in widely diverse 
bio-physical and socio-economic conditions with very different prospects for 
success. Their strategies vary. Some focus on building self-help 
organisations, others on income-generating activities. Some are active in a 
single sub-sector others NGOs may work across sub-sectors. NGOs in 
different countries develop widely differing characteristics according to the 
history of the state, amount of development assistance received and gaps 
perceived in public service provision. This gives rise to a wide range of 
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typologies. Robinson (1991) categorises the NGOs operating in Asia as 
follows: 
1. Large national NGOs working in several states in different parts of the 
country and sometimes acting as intermediaries channelling funds from 
donors to smaller local NGOs. 
2. Large national NGOs working in most districts of one state. 
3. Medium-sized NGOs working in a large number of villages in one o r two 
districts on one state. 
4. Large international NGOs with in-country representation providing 
funding and support to national NGOs. 
5. Small national NGOs working in a group of villages in one locality. 
6. Small International NGOs working directly in one or two localities.  
 
The implication for this study are (a) field analyses in selected districts need to 
carefully distinguish the different NGOs operating in those districts; (b) it is 
important to identify those working in the non-farm sector and those relevant 
to the sub-sectors that could be targeted for intervention; and (c) the need to 
understand the extent and nature of State-NGO and NGO-NGO links.  
 
Strengths and limitations of NGOs:  
Assessment of NGOs by the poor show that their achievements are limited. 
They have a mixed record and that the reality is complex. Narayan (2000) 
draws together the information from Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPA) 
carried out in 50 different countries, covering 60,000 poor people. These 
assessments record the experiences of poverty and the quality of poor 
peoples’ interaction with a range of institutions. This report draws on this 
study, among others, to understand the strengths and limitations of NGOs. 
  
NGOs as resources:  
1. Respond better to local priorities: The very nature of these organisations 
makes it easier for them to understand and react to local needs. Its physical 
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base is usually close to concentrations of poverty (Clark 1991) giving them 
considerable local knowledge. They are also more likely to be trusted than 
government officials. In Ghana, PPA (1995) showed that the poor valued the 
NGOs over governments for being more responsive in the field of health care 
and education. 
 
2. Provide access to additional resources: PPAs reveal that one of the central 
strength of NGOs is their ability to access additional financial, technical and 
often political resources. When the state is weak, NGOs can be critical to 
helping poor people meet everyday needs. This kind of support from NGOs is 
an important component of poor peoples’ coping strategies. They are involved 
in providing food during seasonal shortage, in health care, sponsorships of 
poor school children; running eye camps, veterinary camps. In India they are 
associated with distributing seeds; offering watershed management; 
organising women’s group; and developing income-generating activities.  
 
3. NGOs with religious affiliations provide important safety nets for the poor: 
The importance of support by church was noted in Benin, Panama, Georgia 
and Vietnam. In Pakistan, mosques and shrines were considered valued sites 
for charity. The poor in India mentioned ashrams as a place of refuge. 
 
4. NGOs bring special expertise and contribute to economic opportunities: 
NGOs are perceived to bring expertise that can strengthen livelihood 
opportunities and contribute to overall well being. In Komaka, Ghana, the 
community believed that the assistance of NGOs was more valuable than that 
of the government in establishing a grain bank, to reduce vulnerability to 
droughts. In Togo the NGO expenditure in 1994 exceeded the government 
budget for rural development. In Rajasthan, the village of Bhaonta-Kolyala 
was declared a famine-prone area by the government. Lack of water and loss 
of agricultural income increased migration and social unrest. Since then, an 
NGO (Tarun Bharat Sangh) has helped villagers improve watershed 
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management by organising tree planting and rain water harvesting based on 
traditional practices learned from village elders. This has ensured water 
availability even during the lean season (CSE: 2000). 
 
5. NGOs are more compassionate than government officials: government 
officials are perceived to be rude and unsympathetic to the poor. They would 
rather the poor were not there. In comparison, the NGOs are considered more 
understanding and kind. Hence, they are more positive towards NGOs.  
 
6. NGOs and RNFE: The role of the NGOs in the rural non-farm economy is 
valuable though patchy. Small-scale and poor producers/workers in particular 
have low social capital, and NGOs have been instrumental in organising them 
and promoting their interests. NGOs working in remote areas with tribal 
communities, women and scheduled castes have helped develop income-
generating activities and organised new associations and co-operatives.  
 
Fisher et al identifies three types of NGOs operating in this sector in India. 
One, the Ghandian NGOs tend to focus on traditional artisan crafts and are 
often highly dependent on Khadi and Village Industries Commission for their 
marketing and finance. Two , activist NGOs concentrating on specific issues 
within the RNFE, like child labour.  SEWA is well known for its activities to 
promote the income-generating capacity of poor women and for organising 
rural producers’ co-operatives outside Ahmedabad. The third group is 
constituted of new NGOs founded by professionally educated persons moving 
to the non-governmental sector. PRADHAN is one such organisation. It has 
been prominent in working with carcass flayers, leather tanners and fishermen 
in Uttar Pradesh. The URMAUL trust in Rajasthan work with wool weavers 
and wood carvers. These NGOs have sought to create or sustain employment 
among poor producers and in some cases have done work in technology 
intermediation. 
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Limitations: 
1. Size, coverage and outreach: Narayan notes that though NGOs have 
played a key role in making development more participatory they have only 
limited outreach. PPAs show that in Panama only 10% of the community 
received support from NGOs. In Indonesia the estimate is 7%. In India, 
communities rank the contribution of NGOs to their development as 
secondary to the government’s effort. In Bangladesh, the high awareness of 
NGOs is primarily associated with microcredit. Their limited focus and 
geographical coverage explain the limited outreach.  
 
2. NGOs tend to focus on limited number of issues. Some concentrate on 
organising the rural poor into self-help organisations (Nijera Kori). Others 
channel their efforts to enhance income-generating activities (SEWA; 
Pradhan). The Grameen Bank (Bangladesh) focuses on the provision of 
microcredit. However, large NGOs like BRAC and Proshika combine all three 
approaches. 
 
3. Coverage and size of NGOs is also an important factor. Local NGOs tend 
to be centred upon a small number of districts in the country. Though national 
NGOs are seen to operate in greater number of districts, none have the 
outreach of government agencies. 
 
4. Dependence for finance on government and donors. An increasing share of 
development funds is being channelled through NGOs. They are now largely 
dependent on funding from donor agency and governments. This requires 
NGOs to meet project targets set down by the funding agency, making them 
into ‘contractors rather than community catalysts’. Additionally, target-led 
reporting is often at the cost of quality-led output (India 1998). Senegal PPA 
(1995) shows that in Senegal some NGOs have put achieving financial 
independence as their highest priority. 
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5. Tarmac bias: As with government, NGOs are accused of the tendency to 
reach people who live close to passable roads and miss the really poor who 
live in remote areas. 
 
6. Lack of fit between programme design and local conditions: NGO 
programmes are sometimes designed with limited knowledge of what is 
available on the ground. PPA in Armenia showed the NGOs lacked familiarity 
with local traditions and conditions. It led to programme designs that did not 
work, such as the supply of milk to schoolchildren, which failed as powdered 
milk was supplied without the provision for running water supply. 
 
7. Limited management capacity hinders effectiveness. The PPAs suggest 
that uncertain funding and limited management capacities hinder 
effectiveness and independence of NGOs. This includes difficulties with 
leadership and effective systems of financial management, planning, 
monitoring and evaluation (Fox 1993). Many lack full-time or permanent staff. 
Others operate on a voluntary basis funded by member contribution. Thus 
their capacity to make good use of new resources is limited (Narayan 2000). 
 
8. Insulting behaviour and corruption. The NGOs were also accused of being 
rude and insulting. An in-depth study of the Grameen Bank (1999) showed 
that field staff terrorise, insult and lock up defaulters. PPAs also indicate that 
most poor believe there is little altruism in NGOs.  Relief funds were often 
diverted. Setting up an NGO was seen as an easy way to earn money and 
provide employment to family members. 
 
9. Have not affected power relations. Summarising the finding of all 50 PPAs, 
Narayan concludes that NGOs are making important contributions to the 
coping strategies of the poor. They have however, made no difference to the 
local power relations. There is no evidence that NGOs have helped in the 
inclusion of the poor in local councils. Further, their biggest weakness is that 
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they generally do not tend to support long-term capacity development for local 
self-governance. 
 
Government – NGO links: 
The interaction between government and NGO can take various forms. This 
depends on the economic and socio-political context, the diverse origins of 
NGOs, structures and objectives of the state and of the NGOs.  
 
Both the state and the voluntary sector have their respective advantages. The 
NGOs provide a link between the civil society, the state and the market. The 
Government has the advantage of coverage, outreach, trained and skilled 
human resources and the scope to design multi-dimensional development 
projects. The interactions can range from close partnership at one extreme, to 
attempting to influence the agenda at another. India (1997) shows that 
programmes undertaken by quasi-government institutions in collaboration with 
NGOs seemed to be more effective than the programmes that were 
undertaken by government alone. On the other hand, partnership in education 
in El Salvador is facing difficulties. The NGOs find the government 
‘authoritarian and inefficient’ and ‘erratic and unaccountable’. In Uganda, a 
study was undertaken to ensure more effective distribution and use of 
equalisation grants aimed at micro and small enterprises. The study identified 
a role for NGOs and the private sector in marketing, advertising and product 
development. 
 
In India, the practice of government-NGO partnerships is becoming 
increasingly common, particularly in the management of water resources and 
in watershed management. In Bangladesh, BRAC, Proshika and the Grameen 
Bank have become a force that the government has to take into account. 
However, most NGOs are not involved in watch-dog activities to hold 
governments accountable. 
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Community based organisations: (CBOs)  
CBOs are grassroots organisations managed by members on behalf of 
members (Edwards and Hulme: 1992). Their activities range from mobilising 
communities for infrastructure development projects, cultural festivals, conflict 
resolution within the community, to management of relations with outsiders 
and emergency relief. They are often the only organisation that the poor 
people feel their own and trust. CBOs acting alone have generally not been a 
force for change in local power structures nor in significant development gains 
(Narayan 2000: 151). She further notes that “associations of the poor are 
much more effective to meet the short-term security needs than at fostering 
change in the underlying rules of exclusion”.  Uphoff (1986) notes that while 
isolated instances of local institutional development can be impressive, their 
cumulative effect is negligible.   
 
Neighbourhood and kinship networks are generally in the first line of defence 
in times of difficulty or crisis. Reciprocal obligations are strong. However, there 
are limitations and costs. Narayan concludes with a rather negative 
assessment of CBOs. She notes that networks have few outside resources to 
draw on, and that generally most members of the network are in the same 
plight. This increases the vulnerability of the entire community at times of 
crisis. However, there is evidence to the contrary which shows that this 
vulnerability can be harnessed by outside agencies to benefit communities. 
Additionally, the common vulnerability can give impetus to the community to 
take charge of their own natural resources. Two examples highlight this: 
 
1. Harnessing the strengths of the community to improve natural resources 
management (CSE: 1999a). 
Banni is located in Gujarat’s dry grassland area. The local grass, grown for 
fodder was the main source of income for most of the community. By 1992, 
much of this grassland had disappeared due to invasion by other species of 
grass, increasing soil salinity and overgrazing. In 1995, the Gujarat Institute of 
LITERATURE SURVEY: RNFE AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE 
 
 51 
Desert Ecology (GUIDE) stepped in to try and regenerate the grasslands and 
the degraded land. Their strategy was to build long mounds of soil (height 
0.5m and width 3m), leaving narrow ditches between the mounds. The rain 
was expected to leach the mounds of salt and deposit it in the ditches. When 
the soil was sufficiently leached grass would be grown. The project has been 
very successful and in 1997 biomass production was estimated to be 7.8 
times higher than in unprotected grasslands. This was achieved through a 
participatory approach. The Director of GUIDE directly contacted the village 
elders. Once the elders realised the potential of the project, all the villagers 
were drawn in. Led by GUIDE, a village level committee was set up to 
manage the implementation of the project and the distribution of the grass 
among villagers. 
 
2. Villages protecting their forests in Orissa (CSE: 1999b).  
Forests are a major source of income for many rural communities in the state. 
Depletion of these resources, for various reasons, was threatening the 
livelihood opportunities of the poor. Villagers have essentially organised 
themselves to protect their own forests. The structure for monitoring the forest 
activities varies with the village. In some it is through voluntary participation by 
villagers; others recruit guards whom the villagers pay an honorarium. Today 
almost every village has a structure to protect its forests. 
 
Representation of Small Producers 
The representation of small producers and workers in small units is very 
limited. If producers’ associations do exist they fail to look after the interests of 
small and tiny producer/workers. In India, the primary stakeholders who derive 
their livelihoods from non-farm activities are millions of entrepreneurs, 
producers and workers. Fisher et al (1997) note that there are no effective 
mechanisms in the rural non-farm sector to ensure representation of 
producers and workers in policy-making processes and public agencies. The 
representatives of entrepreneurs and their associations are generally 
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nominated to various consultative committees.  Such nominations are based 
on political affiliations or social status. As a result these nominees tend to 
represent larger entrepreneurs. Often there is collusion and co-option leading 
to non-representation of interests of small producers. This mirrors the power 
relations in the sector. 
 
There is a low level of collective action in the sector. Fisher et al note that 
there are numerous associations and groups formed by producers, traders 
and workers. There are also caste-based organisations, guilds, self-help 
organisations supported by NGOs. Yet few are strong and active and have 
little impact, even though in most instances the sector would gain from being 
better organised. Furthermore, conflict of interests of different groups (i.e., 
producer groups and workers’ associations) leads to competition for 
concessions and patronage.  
 
Trade Unions 
Trade Unions are not common in non-farm sector. In India, unions are found 
only among workers in large sub-sectors like tea, making bidi (indigenous 
cigarettes), matches, and garments. The sheer size of these sub-sectors 
attracts political activists. Some changes have been achieved, like reduction 
in child labour use, but working conditions remain poor.  
 
Small industries associations 
An extensive network of associations with several tiers of organisation is well 
established in India. The associations are a powerful lobbying force on behalf 
of their members. However, most associations cater for urban small-scale 
industries and have not been effective in representing the interests of tiny 
units. These associations do not serve the majority of small industries in the 
rural non-farm sector.  
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Summing up 
1. Civil society institutions like NGOs and CBOs provide valuable support to 
the poor. Their collective action and links and network are a major resource 
for the poor. However, they are not sufficient to lift the communities out of 
poverty. 
2. Most NGOs tend to focus on single -issue problems and/or tend to 
concentrate on a sub-sector, and restrict their activities to a limited area. This 
has problems of outreach and coverage. But on the other hand they develop 
expertise and have in-depth knowledge related to their area/sector of work. 
3. Their close links with the community give the NGOs a better understanding 
of community needs. Hence they tend to be more responsive and effective in 
meeting welfare needs, like providing health care and education. 
4. Experience shows that programmes undertaken by quasi-government 
institutions in collaboration with NGOs seemed to be more effective than 
programmes undertaken by government. 
5. The small and tiny producer/worker units in the RNFE remain largely un-
represented by the producer associations and trade unions, reflecting the 
power relations in the sub-sectors. 
 
Local governance and poverty reduction 
The system of decentralised governance is an instrument for social and 
economic growth. A review of the local government programmes and projects 
show that the emphasis is on welfare-oriented strategies. There are few 
examples of local governments pursuing policies to enhance the production 
base through diversification and increase in productivity, which would 
strengthen the local economy, initiate growth and create income-generating 
opportunities. In the case of India, Kothari (1996) notes that this is a general 
weakness of the Indian planning process. Employment generation has low 
priority. This has affected the social development of the weaker sections.  
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The purpose of development policy at all levels and of country programmes is 
to strike a balance between interventions that promote growth and welfare, 
and those that prevent destitution, particularly with reference to food security. 
Targeting government expenditure to simply reduce poverty is not sufficient. 
Government expenditure is also needed to stimulate economic growth. This 
imbalance in spending is another reason why decentralised governments 
have had little impact on poverty alleviation. An insight into the decision-
making process in local government shows why it is difficult to strike a 
balance at this level. 
 
Karnataka has a long experience with decentralised governance. It is a three-
tier system consisting of zilla parishad, taluk samiti, and mandal panchayat 
(MP). The MP is the first elected tier of the panchayat system comprising a 
cluster of villages with population between 8,000 to 12,000. Aziz, Nelson & 
Babu (1996) analyse the performance of the MP to provide an understanding 
into how these councils choose projects and allocate funds.  
 
1. The final choice of projects reflects the suggestions from the gram sabha 
(village councils). Not surprisingly, the focus is on amenities like house sites, 
electricity, community facilities like health centres, clean drinking water, 
drainage, road construction.  
2.  Projects are selected on the basis of urgency. Additionally, to avoid conflict 
the MP compromises and ensures that each village has a project. 
3.  The list of projects examined by the authors show an overwhelming bias 
towards projects such as drainage, water supply, street lighting, bus shelters 
and school buildings. 
 
They conclude that Mandal Panchayats have “concentrated on amenities and 
public-works oriented projects and neglected production-oriented projects 
such as those in respect of agriculture, animal husbandry and fisheries” (page 
156). Except for one MP that had made a small investment in developing fish 
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seedlings, there was no expenditure on activities that are the mainstay of the 
local economy. 
 
It appears that in a bottom-up decision-making process it is difficult to take a 
perspective of the development needs of the area as a whole. It makes 
strategic thinking difficult. However, the example also highlights the important 
role that local governments can play in identifying and implementing local 
welfare projects. World Bank projects already recognise this. Ayers (2000) 
notes that projects in sectors such as primary health care, education, rural 
water and sanitation and agricultural extension are now more likely to 
consider roles for lower level governments, communities, non-governmental 
organisations and the private sector than in the past. Nepal and Sri Lanka 
have tried to address this difficulty of formulating development strategies at 
the lowest level of government by locating developmental planning slightly 
higher up in the decentralised system. However, this strategy is not without 
problems. 
 
In Nepal, village and district level development committees together formulate 
plans for areas under their jurisdiction and give priority to programmes that 
increase income, employment and agricultural production, utilise local 
resources and skills and protect the environment. An interesting feature of 
decentralisation in Nepal is that NGOs and user groups are also brought into 
the planning process and in project implementation. However, the village 
committees work with a low financial base. Both village and district 
committees lack a reliable data base, suffer from delays in receiving budget 
ceilings and even delays in disbursement (Amatya: 1996).  
 
In Sri Lanka, a four -tier system (National, Provincial, district, local and 
grassroots) was established by the Development Councils Act in 1988. The 
Act also sets out functions for each level. At the grassroots level, the main 
functions of the Gramodaya Mandalaya are to attend to civic requirements 
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and to link the grassroots to the administration. The development functions 
rests with the local level pradeshiya sabhas (PS). These functions include 
village works, experiments in agriculture and experimental farms, preparation 
of programmes for educational facilities, employment generation programmes, 
rural women’s developmental activities, integrated development of selected 
villages and commercial development projects to serve other local authorities 
and the public (Abeyawardana: 1996).  
 
The PS is also empowered to generate its own revenue by way of taxes, 
licence duties and to receive grants on the basis of a nationally accepted 
formula. Furthermore, the central government has provided guidelines for 
‘balanced development’. To prevent duplication and overlapping among 
locally identified projects, a ‘basket of projects’ is proposed by the council at 
the provincial level from which the PS can choose. This policy, however, has 
not been successful, as projects did not always reflect priorities at the 
grassroots level.  
 
The World Bank’s policy of Demand-driven investment funds (DRIF) have 
tried to address this problem. It includes a co-financing matrix, which provides 
incentives to communities to undertake projects in line with national policies, 
but which also allows communities to pursue their own preferences (Ayres: 
2000). This instrument has been used with considerable success in Mexico 
and Brazil.  
 
To sum up:  
Decentralisation and enhanced local governance has had little impact on 
poverty alleviation. This is partly due to lack of lack of balance between 
production and welfare strategies. Within welfare strategies, the focus has 
been on improving the physical infrastructure. There is an under-
representation of programmes addressing issues of human and social 
development. Balance at project level is essential to achieve any change.  
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KEY POINTS:  
1. Decentralisation is being pursued in different countries for different political 
reasons. It thus takes various forms and affects the contours of local 
governance. Though one of the main motives for decentralisation is to 
stimulate local development, it is essentially a political process. All studies of 
governance need to be informed by the political economy of the country. 
Decentralised government should be perceived as part of a continuum, where 
relations between different tiers of government impact on their respective 
ability to function effectively. 
 
2. Participation and accountability are two cornerstones for good governance. 
Though participation has increased with devolution, it has not empowered the 
weaker groups. Their interest are not always identified nor articulated into 
local policy.  Lack of accountability remains a problem. 
 
3. There are serious limitations to what local governance can achieve . It is not 
a panacea for achieving equitable development. Decentralisation can result in 
loss of economies of scale and loss of control over scarce financial resources 
by central government. Local administrative and technical capacity is often 
weaker than at higher levels. Partial fiscal decentralisation may leave the local 
government with inadequate financial resources.  
 
4. Project and programme planners need to assess strength and weakness of 
public and private sector organisations in performing different types of 
function. There is the need to identify the level of government at which the 
project/programme functions can be carried out efficiently and effectively. 
 
5. Poverty interventions are generally categorised as growth and welfare 
strategies. Each of these meets different developmental needs. Thus there is 
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a need to strike a balance. Local governance emphasis is on welfare 
programmes, with growth strategies often neglected.  However, there are 
difficulties in initiating growth programmes at the lowest level of governance. 
Local government policies have had little impact on either poverty or growth.  
 
6. Funding structure and central government distributional policies. Fiscal 
decentralisation does not always match political decentralisation. This can 
leave the local government with inadequate funds. Even when expenditure is 
sanctioned, disbursement of funds is delayed. Politicians are often hesitant to 
expand their tax base as it conflicts with their longer-term political ambitions. 
Fiscal decentralisation should detract from the importance of central 
government distribution policies. It is essential to address inter-jurisdictional 
equity issues.  
 
7.   There is no reference to diversification of rural activities in the literature. 
This reflects the emphasis on providing local amenities and public works.  
 
8.  Role of civil society institutions.  One of the principle reasons why 
democratic local governance is expected to be better able to reflect local 
needs and aspirations is that it encourages and relies on civil organisations to 
assist in local problem identification and project development. The NGOs and 
CBOs have organised collective action and played central roles in self-help 
programmes (see Uphoff: 1993 for details). They are also important channels 
for dissemination of information. However, they tend to focus on issues or 
sectors and choice of such organisations in project implementation has to be 
critically assessed. 
 
9.  Policy and influence of specificity of a given local context – methodological 
implications. The above discussion clearly indicates the importance of 
understanding the local context for institutional change. It implies a need to 
determine whether and to what extent central government agencies have in 
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fact relinquished power to the local level. This will involve review of relevant 
legislation governing decentralisation and the structure and form of local 
government. The ability of the local government to act and carry out functions 
to benefit the poor must be contextualised (a) upwards – in terms of its 
relations to national polity and to national level leaders from that particular 
region; and (b) downwards – in terms its relations with local NGOs, CBOs, the 
private sector and the main target groups. The nature of these links will 
determine the synergy that can be generated and co-management that could 
be envisaged in a rural development project relying on improved governance 
for service delivery.  
 
10. The level of engagement of the poor in affect government intervention is 
important. Understanding levels of social capital, power relations and the 
nature of social networks and their membership will be central to informing 
policy design. 
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3. THE GROWTH AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE RURAL NON-FARM 
ECONOMY: A REVIEW OF THE ISSUES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
 
 
David A. Clark 
University of Cambridge 
 
Introduction 
This section of the review attempts to provide answers to key questions by 
drawing on a few select sources (cited as “key references” in the 
bibliography). The bibliography has been extended to include a list of other 
relevant material which may be useful for research in progress. The goals of 
this section are to examine current thinking on the RNFE; and identify 
examples of the successful and unsuccessful transformation of the RNFE in 
developing countries. More specifically, this review will:  
1. analyse the current thinking on, and evidence of, distress diversification 
and positive diversification, and identify the implications for local 
governance; 
2. examine the factors conditioning incentives and capacity for non-farm 
activities; 
3. examine issues of linkages between non-farm activities and agriculture 
and overall rural development, and reflect on the implications for local 
governance; 
4. consider – in the context of formally-constituted government activities – 
how “soft” (public services support) and “hard” (infrastructure) provision 
are linked to positive and negative outcomes for RNFE; and 
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5. consider – in the context of non-constituted governance and institutions 
– the impact non-government organisations and other institutions have had 
on rural non-farm activities. 
 
Thus the first part of this review focused more on the significance of 
decentralisation and participation in contributing (or not) to positive outcomes 
for the RNFE (in other words it examined the relations between central and 
local government, and between people – especially poor people – and local 
government. This section, by contrast, is more concerned with how formally 
constituted local government provides the basis for local economic 
development, and how non-formal governance institutions are related to this 
process. In the first section we found that decentralisation policies have little 
relevance or even intention to promote local economic development.  
 
The Significance of the RNFE 
In recent years increasing emphasis has been placed on the significance of 
the non-farm sector for economic growth and poverty elimination in rural areas 
(e.g. Lanjouw and Lanjouw, 1997; Islam, 1998; and Gordon, 1999). The 
recent flurry of interest in the RNFE reflects the growing realisation that the 
successful transformation of this sector could hold the key to resolving some 
of the most fundamental development problems typically encountered in poor 
countries: 
 
“In most developing countries, the rural labour force is growing rapidly, but 
employment opportunities are not keeping pace. As land available for the 
expansion of agriculture becomes increasingly scarce, non-farm employment 
must expand if deepening rural poverty is to be avoided. Policy makers and 
analysts alike look to the non-farm sector to increase rural employment, 
contribute to economic growth, improve income distribution, and alleviate 
poverty. Expanding opportunities in rural areas outside of agriculture also may 
help stem the migration of rural dwellers to the cities and slow the spread of 
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urban congestion and pollution. At any feasible pace of growth of large-scale 
industrialisation, urban countries are unlikely to absorb the rapidly increasing 
labour force. Therefore, it is up to the more labour -intensive rural non-farm 
sector to absorb excess labour, promote economic growth, and diversify 
income sources” (Islam 1998: p.1). 
 
Livelihood Diversification: concept, theory and evidence 
We begin with a brief review of the literature on livelihood diversification.3 Ellis 
(1997, p.5) defines livelihood diversification “as the process by which rural 
families construct a diverse portfolio of activities and social support 
capabilities in their struggle for survival and in order to improve their standard 
of living”.  In stark contrast to traditional wisdom, diversification is not merely a 
transient phenomenon (e.g. Saith, 1992) or one associated with a desperate 
struggle for survival in poor countries. Instead, livelihood diversification is 
widespread and enduring (Ellis, 1998, p.2), and “may be associated with 
achieving livelihood security under improving economic conditions as well as 
with livelihood distress in deteriorating conditions.” (Ellis, 1997, p.2; see also 
Collier, 1988; and Preston, 1989). 
 
There are large variations in the share of non-farm income in poor countries 
(see Ellis, 1997, section III; Reardon, 1997; Haggblade, Hazell and Brown, 
1989; and Sahn, 1994). In regional terms, average non-farm income shares in 
rural areas are higher in Africa (42%) and Latin America (40%) than Asia 
(32%) (Reardon, 1998, p.290).4 There is also some evidence to suggest that 
income diversification may have increased in recent years. For example, 
Bryceson (1996; and 1997) has found that rural sub-Saharan Africa is 
becoming steadily less agrarian and increasingly more reliant on non-farm 
sources of income. Various other case studies point to the rapid expansion of 
growth and employment in the RNFE (Reardon, 1998, pp.291-292). Thus, 
employment in the non-farm economy is a crucial source of rural income in 
many poor countries that seems to be of increasing importance. 
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The economic rational for diversification into non-farm activity is described in 
the farm-household model (see Hymer and Resnick, 1969; Nakajima, 1970; 
1986; Singh et. al. 1986; and Ellis, 1993), which “predicts diversification as a 
function of on-farm returns to labour time compared to off-farm earning 
opportunities” (Ellis, 1998, p.3). It is common to distinguish between two broad 
motives for diversification in the literature (e.g. Hart, 1994; Davies, 1996; and 
Ellis, 1998). On the one hand, diversification may be driven by economic 
necessity and desperation in a bid to survive (“distress” diversification). On the 
other hand, diversification may take place through choice in an effort to take 
advantage of new opportunities (“positive” diversification). Several studies 
seem to suggest that diversification is driven by necessity rather than choice 
(e.g. Swift, 1998; and RIO, 1998); however, other evidence indicates “that 
opportunity and favourable macro-economic policy are very important” 
(Gordon, 1999, p.12). 
 
Different forms of diversification have different policy implications. There is a 
strong case for the state to encourage and support positive forms of livelihood 
diversification in order to reduce rural poverty and enhance livelihoods. One 
option is to identify and target the most promising sub-sectors in the RNFE - 
an approach favoured by Reardon (1998) and Dasgupta (1998). Much 
broader forms of intervention are required to deal with cases of distress 
diversification. Here the goal is not so much to encourage or support 
diversification, but to tackle the economic and social factors forcing 
households into the non-farm economy. Depending on the circumstances, 
appropriate interventions may include measures to promote agriculture. 
 
The Determinants of Diversification 
For policy purposes, it is vital to identify the factors that motivate households 
that are primarily farm-based to participate in the RNFE. (We should also note 
that there may be some households which already specialise entirely in ‘non-
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farm’ activities in rural areas, and that much of our discussion has relevance 
for further direct conversion to non-farm activities as well as diversification by 
those who continue to farm). Ellis (1997; 1998) and Reardon (1998) both 
provide reviews of the factors that motivate diversification. Key determinants 
of household diversification include:  
· Seasonal factors. Participation in the RNFE takes place to supplement 
household income during periods of low agricultural activity. In some cases 
seasonal migration may also occur not so much to augment income, but to 
remove a hungry mouth from the household (Davies, 1996). In periods of 
high agriculture activity, farming can impose a squeeze on the RNFE. 
· Labour Markets. In general, diversification will take place when the 
marginal returns from working in the RNFE are greater than the agricultural 
wage rate. However, this kind of diversification is hampered by the problem 
of missing markets in Africa and market imperfections in Asia (see Ellis, 
1998, pp.5-6). 
· Risk strategies. Avoiding or reducing risk is often advanced as the 
primary motive behind livelihood diversification (e.g. Bryceson, 1996). The 
basic idea is that households select a portfolio of activities in an attempt to 
anticipate and mitigate against threats to family welfare from failure in 
individual activities (see Alderman and Paxson, 1992). Poorer households 
and those located in unfavourable agricultural zones are more likely to be 
“pushed” into less risky non-farm activities (Reardon, 1998, p.286). 
· Credit Markets. The failure of credit markets provides another motive for 
livelihood diversification (Binswanger, 1983; Reardon, 1997; 1998). In the 
absence of credit, farmers often participate in non-farm activities to raise 
money for agriculture inputs or to purchase farm equipment. 
· Asset Strategies. Diversification may occur in order to acquire or 
enhance household assets (stocks of capital). This process helps to 
achieve greater livelihood security in the future (see Ellis, 1998, pp.9-10). 
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· Coping Behaviour. Diversification that occurs as an involuntary 
response to a disaster or unanticipated livelihood failure.  
 
This list indicates that diversification can take place for positive as well as 
negative reasons. In the following pages we will consider some of the other 
factors that condition the incentive and capacity for non-farm activity.  
 
The Links Between Non-Farm Activity and Agriculture  
The relationships between farm and non-farm activity is described in the rural 
growth linkage model which originated in the 1970s (Johnston and Kilby, 
1975; and Mellor, 1976) and has governed policy discussions for several 
years. The basic idea is that agricultural growth stimulates the development of 
the RNFE in poor countries through production, expenditure and investment 
linkages (Haggblade and Hazel, 1989; Hazell and Haggblade, 1993; and 
Reardon, 1998). Production linkages occur when increments in farm income 
induce investment in non-farm activity in order to supply goods and services 
to agriculture (“backward” or “upstream” linkages) or provide processing and 
distribution services related to farm outputs (“forward” or “downstream” 
linkages). Expenditure linkages, on the other hand, take place when 
agricultural incomes are spent on products produced in the local non-farm 
economy, such as consumer goods and services. Investment linkages occur if 
profit from agriculture is invested in the RNFE.5 
 
The significance and magnitude of these linkages have been investigated in a 
series of papers (e.g. Ranis and Stewart, 1987; Ranis, 1990; Hazell and 
Haggblade, 1993; and Bagachwa and Stewart, 1992). Empirical studies 
utilising the growth linkage model suggest that agricultural growth leads to 
large multiplier effects in the rural economy. Studies in Asia have found that 
$1 extra value added in agriculture generates a $0.80 additional non-farm 
income (Bell, Hazell and Slade, 1982; and Hazell and Ramasamy, 1991), 
while a study of sub-Saharan Africa implies a lower multiplier of $0.50 growth 
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in non-farm income for extra $1 of agricultural income (Haggblade, et. al., 
1989). On the whole, the RNFE “grows fastest and most equitably where 
agriculture is dynamic” (Reardon, 1998, p.284). These considerations suggest 
that governments in poor countries can promote the RNFE simply by 
supporting the development of agriculture. 
 
The crux of the problem with the growth linkage approach is that it presumes 
the direction of causality is always from farm growth to non-farm growth, and 
not vice versa.6 This suggests that the RNFE “has little dynamic of its own and 
would be unlikely to take a leading role in employment and income growth in 
the rural economy” (Ellis, 1997, p.28). In Saith’s (1992, p.114) words, “the tail 
cannot wag the dog”. In reality however, there are many different links 
between the development of agriculture and the RNFE; and the performance 
of either one of these sectors can affect the other in a variety of ways (see 
below). Some investigations even suggest that stagnation in the agricultural 
sector may be behind the development of the RNFE (Chandrasekhar, 1993); 
while other studies indicate  a weak link between agriculture and the RNFE 
(Valentine, 1993; and Tschirley and Weber, 1994). Together, these 
considerations underline the need for an integrated development strategy in 
rural areas which includes the non-farm sector.  
 
Reardon (1998) has explored the ways in which agriculture and the RNFE 
interact with each other. On the one hand, the nature and performance of 
agriculture can affect the RNFE by:  
· influencing the price of agricultural products (which affects the cost of 
inputs and wage levels in the RNFE); 
· regulating the supply of labour to the RNFE; 
· determining agro-processing opportunities (through the composition and 
volume of agricultural output); and  
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· affecting the incentives and capacity of households to participate in rural 
non-farm activities (ibid., pp.301-303). 
 
On the other hand, the RNFE can affect agriculture by: 
· increasing the value of land (as in horticultural areas of Chile, Peru and 
Bolivia) and/or the profitability of products entering the agro-industrial 
system; 
· affecting the availability of cash to invest in agriculture and adopt more 
appropriate technologies; 
· influencing the factor and product prices facing farmers, and thus farm 
profitability and product mix; 
· reducing the overall income risk for farmers, thus increasing the incentive 
to invest in more risky but profitable agricultural technologies; 
· competing for farm resources, which affects the factor bias of farm 
technology; and 
· reducing pressure on land in fragile areas (ibid., pp.312-314). 
To this could be added the creation of demand for agricultural outputs for 
processing and as industrial raw materials. 
 
One challenge for future research is to find ways of strengthening existing 
links between agriculture and the RNFE in poor countries. Once this is 
achieved, the growth and development of these two sectors should become 
mutually reinforcing. Numerous constraints have been identified however. 
These barriers are discussed elsewhere in this paper. 
 
The Role of Government and other Institutions  
This brings us to the question of how government and other institutions are 
linked to the growth and transformation of the RNFE. The RNFE is affected by 
formally constituted government activity (such as the provision of public 
services and infrastructure), and the presence of non-constituted governance 
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and institutions (most notably, private sector enterprise and non-governmental 
organisations). Most of the literature reviewed here says little of substance 
about the impact of government and non-governmental institutions on the 
RNFE.7 In addition, the available literature fails to draw a clear distinction 
between the activities of “local” and “national” government, which makes it 
particularly difficult, though not impossible, to consider the role of local 
government vis-à-vis the RNFE. Despite these difficulties however, it is 
possible to highlight some of the key issues and relevant questions for future 
research. 
 
Macro-Economic Policy 
First of all, it is worth emphasising that the development of the RNFE is 
affected by the same factors that facilitate “broad-based” economic growth  
(Gordon, 1999, p.20 & Box 1). In particular, it is frequently argued that well-
designed macro-economic policies are necessary for the development of the 
RNFE because they help to achieve an efficient allocation of resources 
throughout the economy  (e.g. Reardon, 1998, p.325; Islam, 1998, p.3; and 
Gordon, 1999, p.9). Economic reforms in poor countries typically include 
devaluation of overvalued exchange rates, liberalisation of trade (including the 
reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers), privatisation, cuts in subsidies, and 
the reduction of fiscal deficits. The positive effects of these policies in terms of 
improved resource allocation should extend to rural areas, particularly to the 
extent that they eliminate the urban bias that characterises economic policy in 
many poor countries. Insofar as economic liberalisation reduces urban bias 
we can expect to see an improvement in the terms of trade for rural products, 
which is significant for the RNFE as well as agriculture. 
 
By itself however, macro-economic reform is not sufficient to promote the 
development of the RNFE. There is “significant ambiguity” concerning the 
impact of economic reforms on rural areas, especially in the short term 
(Reardon, 1998, p.325). While liberalisation may improve the terms of trade 
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and create opportunities for rural non-farm activity, it can also expose the rural 
economy to competition from urban enterprises and imports. In many cases, 
capacity constraints also make it difficult for those working in the RNFE to 
respond to the incentives generated by economic reform or prevent new 
opportunities from being allocated in an equitable way that includes the asset-
poor. The challenge then, is to design policies and investments that help local 
economies to adjust and take advantage of their new situation, rather than 
erecting barriers to the location of small and medium non-farm industry. One 
way forward involves helping the poor to participate, through rural non-farm 
enterprise start-ups, contract farming and wage employment (ibid, p.337). 
Such initiatives will be discussed presently, and highlight a key role for local 
government and NGOs to play in the development of the RNFE. 
 
Soft and Hard Infrastructure 
Investment in infrastructure has been identified as one of the most crucial 
factors behind rural non-farm activity (e.g. Ellis, 1997; Islam, 1998; and 
Reardon, 1998). It is important to improve both “hard” infrastructure (such as 
roads, electrification and telecommunications) and “soft” infrastructure (such 
as banking systems, market information, education and training) in order to 
reduce transaction costs for rural industry and raise the productivity of the 
RNFE. Several studies place a strong emphasis on education, which has 
been identified as a critical constraint on household participation in the RNFE 
(Evans and Ngau, 1991; and Dercon and Krishnan, 1996). In particular, there 
is a need to train rural people in the skills that permit them to gain access to 
skilled labour markets (Reardon, 1998, p.326). 
 
According to Reardon (1998, p.305), the density of infrastructure, rural town 
services and population is positively associated with earnings in the rural non-
farm sector (although of course the direction of causality needs to be 
established). Improvements in the quantity and quality of infrastructure not 
only reduce transaction costs for marketable products and make additional 
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inputs (electricity, transportation etc.) available at lower costs, but also 
increase the scope for farm and non-farm business investment.8 One possible 
entry point for future research relates to the importance of rural towns as focal 
points for the development of the RNFE. In many countries local authorities 
have not played a prominent role “in determining the sites, incentives and 
infrastructure for non-farm investment” (Ellis, 1997, p.37). Yet several 
researchers have pointed towards the significance of rural towns for 
generating non-farm income (Haggblade, et. al., 1989; Evans and Ngau, 
1991; and Ellis, 1997). 
 
It is worth noting that spending on infrastructure can increase inequalities in 
rural areas and the non-farm economy if such investments are concentrated in 
growth areas and avoid the bulk of poorer households which are usually 
located in the “hinterland” of rural areas (Reardon, 1998, p.305).9 The 
development of roads and hard infrastructure can also bring the RNFE closer 
to cities and urban centres, which may increase competition for local products 
and create labour shortages by reducing the cost of migration to urban cities 
(ibid., pp.305-308). In some cases, local authorities will undoubtedly need to 
take steps to ensure that there are sufficient incentives for people to work in 
the RNFE rather than migrate using the roads that were intended to promote 
local rural activities.  
 
Agriculture and the RNFE 
A key objective for future research is to consider how to create links between 
agricultural policy and the development of the RNFE. The government and 
local authorities can play a useful role in terms of identifying and promoting 
the development of promising sub-sectors.10 Here “[t]he specific goal should 
be to provide the incentives and capacity for rural households and RNF [rural 
non-farm] enterprises to overcome entry barriers, and to create ‘linkage 
friendly’ agriculture and RNF activities” (Reardon, 1998, p.327).  
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More attention also needs to be paid to the design of agricultural technology 
and product priority strategies. Research needs to consider the weight 
farmers attach to the returns on new farm technologies compared with the 
returns on resources employed in the non-farm sector. In some cases farmers 
may want to release labour from agricultural activities to take advantage of 
income opportunities in the RNFE. Thus, it is by no means certain that 
agricultural research should “be searching exclusively for labour-using 
technologies, even in labour abundant areas” (ibid.). 
 
More knowledge is also needed to understand farm and non-farm linkage 
through agro-industry and agricultural diversification involving small-scale 
firms. One possibility is the development of “scale neutral” agricultural 
technologies which benefit both small and large scale farmers, combined with 
agro-processing technologies that can be handled by small and medium scale 
agro-industrial firms (ibid, p.328). Such technologies help to maximise rural 
employment, since small-scale firms tend to have relatively high employment-
output ratios. Small farms and agro-processing firms are also more likely to 
invest profits locally or make use of goods and services supplied by local 
firms, “leading to further ripple effects in the local economy” (ibid, p.329). 
 
As incomes rise in poor countries, potential areas for developing farm and 
non-farm linkages are likely to include “processed cereals, tubers and roots 
and pulses, processed and fresh fruit, vegetables and dairy and other 
livestock products” (ibid.). The development of these sectors will require vast 
improvements in the co-ordination of rural policy. In particular, there is a 
pressing need for close co-operation in the formulation and implementation of 
policy in the farm and non-farm sectors. One policy challenge is to increase 
the reach of employment spill-over effects of agro-industrialisation, which 
requires more small and medium scale farmers to become involved in the 
production process. Unfortunately, their participation is frequently constrained 
by insufficient access to credit and other inputs.  
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Another policy challenge is “to facilitate co-ordination between farms and 
companies so that scale economies can be created and exploited” (ibid, 
p.331). The crux of the problem is that agro-industrial firms and other spin-off 
businesses will be reluctant to invest optimally, unless they can be reasonably 
certain that farmers will supply sufficient inputs of the appropriate type. By the 
same token, farmers will be reluctant to shift towards new crops and invest in 
physical or human capital in the absence of a profitable market among agro-
processors and distributors. These considerations imply an important role for 
local government in terms of co-ordinating various institutions in the public 
and private sector.  Reardon observes that: 
“The role of the public sector is crucial in facilitating communication, 
lowering transaction costs and providing technical knowledge that 
could lead to mutually advantageous solutions generating the requisite 
investment in both sectors. This would involve legal reform to sanction 
contracts, technical training, and market information and business 
linkage information systems” (ibid.). 
 
Private Enterprise and Market Structure 
As we have seen, economic reform and investment in infrastructure can 
threaten the survival and development of small and medium-scale enterprise 
in the RNFE. In countries such as Chile, Mexico, the Philippines and South 
Africa, reductions in economic and ‘natural’ forms of protection have exposed 
small and medium scale rural enterprises to intense competition from large-
scale manufacturing (Reardon, 1998, p.333). In a liberal economic policy 
environment, the challenge is to help smaller firms identify gaps in markets, 
exploit their competitive advantages, and promote various arrangements 
based on their mutual interest with larger urban enterprises. More traditional 
forms of support for the RNFE include tax breaks, the installation of 
infrastructure (discussed above), and packages that provide financial 
LITERATURE SURVEY: RNFE AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE 
 
 82 
assistance, credit and technical services (ibid, p.333; and Gordon, 1999, 
p.20). 
 
It is also worth investigating the growth in “business linkage” between large 
urban companies and small rural firms contracted in franchising 
arrangements. Subcontracting is growing rapidly in East Asia and can also be 
found in Latin America and some parts of Africa, such as South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. Such arrangements are promising and can transfer skills to small 
firms, provide access to dynamic markets and even provide credit. The 
viability of these arrangements however, may require investment in 
infrastructure to reduce costs (see Reardon, 1998, p.334). 
 
At least one study has identified rural non-farm enterprise as a key source of 
income generation, employment and growth (Fisher, et. al. 1997), although 
some doubts have been expressed about the long term potential of the sector 
(Saith, 1992). More research is required to investigate the relationship 
between the growth and development of the RNFE (the so called “forgotten 
sector”) and the institutional environment.  
 
Enabling the Poor to Participate in the RNFE 
There is also an emphasis on interventions that enable the poor to take 
advantage of rural non-farm employment opportunities in some of the 
literature (e.g. Reardon, 1998; and Ellis, 1997). An important role for 
government and other organisations is to strengthen the asset base of the 
poor – particularly in the areas of finance, education, access to credit and 
land-holdings.11 In some countries, lack of access to land represents a crucial 
factor inhibiting the development of the RNFE, since the growth of farm 
income is crucial for diversification into other activities. 
 
Local Government and other Agents 
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The preceding discussion highlights some of the areas in which various levels 
of government (and other organisations) can intervene in order to promote 
rural non-farm development. Following Nurul Islam, it is reasonable to 
presume that as long as “…local government institutions have decision-
making powers and adequate financial resources, they can promote the 
growth and vitality of the non-farm sector” (Islam. 1998, p.3). Many examples 
of successful interventions by local governments in the RNFE can be found in 
the literature. For instance, in some parts of East Asia local authorities have 
provided seed capital and managerial expertise, thus shouldering the risks of 
new ventures and stimulating the growth of private enterprise (ibid.).12 
 
One possibility is that the decentralisation of power to local government may 
promote the development of the RNFE. But empirical studies have failed to 
find evidence of a clear link between decentralisation and economic growth 
(e.g. Goldman, 1998) (see also the first section of this review). In principal, 
decentralisation can affect economic growth in at least three ways:13 
1. By increasing economic efficiency in public spending, which can 
enhance growth; 
2. By causing macro-economic instability, which can hinder growth;  
3. Poor countries have fundamentally different institutions and 
economic environments than rich countries and will not reap the 
benefits or suffer the consequences of decentralisation in the same 
way.  
 
A more recent study undertaken on behalf of NRI has concluded “that there is 
no clear or automatic linkage between decentralisation and growth and that 
the design is critical in determining whether it leads to improved efficiency and 
higher growth, exacerbates the deficits and instability connected to lower 
growth, or simply becomes mirrored in institutional constraints” (KHANYA, 
2000, p.6). Thus future research needs to: 
LITERATURE SURVEY: RNFE AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE 
 
 84 
· investigate the overall relationship between local government and the 
development of the RNFE, taking into account the economic and 
institutional factors that affect that relationship; 
· consider the various functions of local government and the factors that 
determine their effect on the RNFE; and  
· consider how different forms of decentralisation can affect the activities 
local government undertakes in support of the RNFE.14 
 
Other agents can also play important roles in terms of promoting the RNFE. 
For example, in Uganda decentralisation has involved the private sector and 
NGOs as contractors, which might have boosted the local economy 
(KHANYA, 2000, p.16), although initial NRI fieldwork results suggest there is 
little explicit benefit in two districts.  
 
We have touched briefly on private sector enterprise, but have said little about 
NGOs. These have the potential to make an important contribution to rural 
development. Like government, these organisations can initiate worthwhile 
projects in many of the areas described above (though generally on a much 
smaller scale). It is not possible to review the relevant literature on NGOs here 
(but see also the first section of this review).15 However, it is worth 
emphasising that in many poor countries NGOs and the private sector have 
not been able to fill the gap left by government. 
 
The Growth and Transformation of the RNFE: Two Examples 
The final part of this paper tries to put the above into context by drawing 
attention to some more concrete examples of the successful and unsuccessful 
transformation of the RNFE in two developing countries, India and Ghana.16 
The section on India here is short and intended only as an introduction; there 
is a much more substantial literature review specific to India available from 
this project on the RNFE (Coppard, 2001). 
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India 
In India increasing numbers of people are employed in the RNFE, which can 
account for between 35% and 65% of rural household income (Dasgupta, 
1998, p.5). It is possible to identify both positive and negative factors behind 
the growth in rural non-farm activities in India, which “implies that two very 
different groups of people are entering the labour market for such 
employment” (ibid., p.6). In Punjab, western UP and Tamil Nadu, there is 
evidence of positive diversification among households which have benefited 
from agricultural growth. On the other hand, there are also strong indications 
of distress diversification in certain parts of India. For example, in Rajasthan 
and Gujarat low levels of agricultural development have pushed rural workers 
into the construction and mining sectors, which are characterised by low 
wages and poor working conditions.17 
 
The growth and transformation of the RNFE in India varies between states 
(see Chandrasekhar, 1993; Fisher, et. al. 1997; and Dasgupta, 1998). India is 
a diverse country that provides a range of useful case studies to inform 
research. It is possible to identify examples of 
· strong links between agriculture and the development of the RNFE (as in 
Punjab);  
· successful RNFE development due to government policies rather than 
agricultural (as in Gujarat); and  
· successful agricultural growth without any commensurate increase in non-
farm activity (as in West Bengal). 
 
Several factors have affected the growth and transformation of the RNFE in 
India. These factors include macro-economic reform, agricultural and 
industrial policy, regulation and poverty reduction programmes (c.f. Dasgupta, 
1998, pp.14-18). It is worth noting that the Indian case underlines the 
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importance of good infrastructure for the RNFE. There is evidence of a strong 
positive correlation between rural non-farm employment and the presence of 
railways, good roads, electrification and goods vehicles across different states 
(though once again careful understanding of the causal connections and their 
direction is needed to inform policy) (ibid, p.17 & table 6). India also highlights 
the need for technological change in certain sectors of the RNFE. In many 
cases, reliance on traditional skills and techniques is no longer appropriate 
and has held back the growth of household manufacturing (Fisher, et. al. 
1997). But there are signs that the government can encourage the private 
sector to invest in new technologies by relaxing regulatory restrictions. 
 
Low levels of education and skills emerge as a critical constraint on the ability 
of households to undertake rural non-farm employment in India. There is also 
strong evidence that households are pushed into the RNFE by insufficient 
access to land.18 Of particular significance in the Indian context, however, is 
the caste system, which restricts low caste households to certain occupations 
and prohibits them from taking part in others. Depending on religion, social 
status and location, similar restrictions also apply to women. Such practices 
reduce the survival options and increase the vulnerability of these groups of 
people. 
 
The Indian experience illustrates the importance of non-farm employment for 
large numbers of poor people residing in rural areas. Given the shear 
diversity, it is essential to avoid generalisations. Different regions require 
different policies to support the development of the RNFE and alleviate 
poverty. In regions with stagnating agriculture and high levels of distress 
diversification, policy measures that bring maximum benefits to the poor are 
required. In areas with dynamic rural economies, consideration could be given 
to developing sectors with the highest growth potential. 
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Ghana 
In Ghana growth in the industrial sector has outpaced agricultural growth. 
Rural employment is mostly informal and takes place in small family 
enterprises. Moreover, rural unemployment is not high compared to the 
situation in urban areas, though most rural non-farm employment relies on 
links with towns and urban markets. The seasonal nature of farming allows 
households to participate in the RNFE during the slack periods of the farming 
year (ILO, 1989). Each of Ghana’s three agricultural zones is able to produce 
a varying set of rural products. This has created opportunities for 
specialisation and trade, thus stimulating the RNFE. The RNFE appears to be 
expanding in Ghana, although the evidence is sketchy making it difficult to 
draw firm conclusions. It is likely that remuneration and working conditions are 
exceptionally poor in much of the RNFE and the incidence of child labour is 
high. 
 
According to Collinson (1998) factors affecting the RNFE in Ghana include: 
· Education. At least one study points towards a small but positive 
relationship between education and business success in the RNFE 
(Vijverberg, 1995). Education appears to help businessmen select the 
most profitable portfolio of business activities; while illiteracy and 
innumeracy place constraints on record keeping, thus restricting the 
expansion of business. 
· Infrastructure. It is recognised that: “Decrepit roads and transport, poor 
access to potable water, and the limited extent of rural electrification add to 
the costs of running rural enterprises” in Ghana (Collinson, 1998, p.7). 
· Credit. Lack of access to credit has often been identified as a crucial 
constraint on rural development in Ghana. While the credit climate in 
Ghana does not seem to be completely unfavourable to business, there 
are problems. Government policy has forced many rural banks to reduce 
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operating costs (Atkintade, 1997a), which has effectively made it more 
difficult for small businesses to access credit. 
· Government policies. In particular, the maintenance of a large public 
sector and the transfer of many officials from urban headquarters to rural 
areas may have boosted the rural economy. Economic reform in the mid 
1980s and a more recent efficiency drive may also have improved the 
overall performance of the economy. 
· Information flows and appropriate technology. There are indications that 
the RNFE is constrained by a general lack of information regarding 
suitable technologies in Ghana (e.g. Akintade, 1997b). 
· Cultural constraints. “Business requirements and cultural obligations are 
often incompatible in Ghana” (Collinson, 1998, p.9). For example, the 
requirement to share income with extended family and kin can hamper re-
investment in family enterprises (Vyakarnam, et. al. 1991). The 
subservient position of women entrepreneurs and a more general lack of 
“true entrepreneurial spirit” also undermine the development of the RNFE 
in Ghana. 
· NGO activities. Local and international NGOs have supported rural non-
farm activities in Ghana for some time. Most of these groups have formed 
to help resolve credit problems or to facilitate access to processing 
technologies and business skills. There is a pressing need for NGOs to 
focus on all aspects of small enterprise development in Ghana. For 
example, business failure is virtually guaranteed by only providing 
technical expertise to a firm with no managerial competence. 
 
No research exists to indicate which factors are the most constraining (or 
enabling) for the RNFE (Collinson, 1998, p.11).  
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Summing up 
The development of the RNFE has the potential to stimulate economic growth 
and employment in rural areas, which is fundamental for tackling poverty and 
inequality. It may also help to curb migration from the countryside to 
overcrowded cities. Thus, the growth of the RNFE has increasingly been 
regarded as a good thing. We have seen that governments, local and 
national, and NGOs can intervene in a variety of ways to create the incentive 
and capacity for rural non-farm development. In particular, it would be useful 
to explore ways of creating and strengthening existing linkages between farm 
and non-farm development in rural areas. 
 
The literature suggests there is a clear and unequivocal case for supporting 
positive forms of diversification into non-farm activity which enhance rural 
livelihoods. In cases where the poor are “pushed” into the RNFE in desperate 
bids to survive a more pragmatic approach may be required. The literature is 
less clear on the broad policy instruments (such as large-scale welfare 
payments) that might have to be employed in both the farm and non-farm 
sectors to deal with rural poverty in the absence of local rural economic 
growth. The literature says virtually nothing on how government (national or 
local) assess the relative merits of promoting farm and non-farm activities in 
order to forge a coherent rural development strategy. 
 
Finally, it is worth bearing in mind that the promotion of equitable development 
in the RNFE will require governments to address two common “paradoxes” 
identified by Reardon (1998). They are: 
1.  The Household Paradox - reflecting the fact that the poorest households 
typically have the greatest incentive or need for non-farm employment to 
raise income, but are the most constrained due to lack of assets (skills and 
capital etc.) and opportunities (determined by proximity to RNFE labour and 
product markets). This paradox underlines the importance of removing 
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entry barriers into the RNFE and enhancing the poorest households’ 
capacity to take advantage of non-farm employment opportunities. 
2.  The Inter-Zone Paradox - reflecting the fact that rural zones with 
relatively poor agriculture and infrastructure typically have the greatest 
need for remunerative non-farm employment (to compensate for a poor 
farm sector), but are the most constrained by a lack of assets for non-farm 
market development (e.g. good roads, skilled labour and economic sources 
of raw materials). The main challenge associated with this paradox is the 
promotion of investment in infrastructure and skills in resource-poor zones. 
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Notes 
 
1 However, the widespread policy of the World Bank in promoting government 
decentralisation and local government as one of the means of improving 
accountability is having a significant affect in political change which in many 
respects is changing the form of political regime. 
 
2 These include Bolivia and Honduras in Latin America, India and Philippines 
in Asia; Ukraine in Eastern Europe and Mali in Africa. 
 
3 There is a vast literature on livelihood diversification. For the appropriate 
references see Ellis (1997, p.2) and the extended bibliography below. 
 
4 However, evidence seems to point towards a greater reliance on non-farm 
income in rural Asia than rural Africa, due to differences in the root causes of 
poverty (Ellis, 1997, p.13). 
 
5 Reardon (1998, p.289) argues that in the absence of credit, investment 
linkages may be crucial for the development of rural non-farm activity. 
 
6 It is also possible to challenge the assumptions of the rural growth linkage 
model (c.f. Hariss, 1987; and Hart 1989; 1993). 
 
7 One possible exception is Reardon (1998), esp. pp.325-334. 
 
8 Several studies have identified infrastructure as a key determinant of farm 
and non-farm investment (c.f. Reardon, 1998, Box, 16, p.306). 
 
9 Reardon contrasts the case of Taiwan Province of China with the Republic 
of Korea. 
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10 Sector specific policies and agricultural policy tends to be “severely 
neglected” in rural non-farm development debates (Reardon, 1998, p.327). 
 
11 Several initiatives have been launched to improve the assets of the poor 
and provide access to rural non-farm activities in the context of the green 
revolution (c.f. Reardon, 1998, p.332). 
 
12 For other examples of successful interventions by local governments in the 
RNFE see KHANYA (2000). 
 
13 On this see the World Bank’s paper on “Decentralisation and Economic 
Growth” cited in the bibliography.  
 
14 These are the key objectives of the “local government” component of this 
project. 
 
15 See Stringfellow et. al. (1996), Fisher et. al. (1997) and section 7.2 below 
on NGOs in Africa and India. 
 
16 This section draws largely on the work of Dasgupta (1998) and Collinson 
(1998), who investigate most of the issues raised here in greater depth. 
 
17 Chanda (1993) reports that 50 per cent of Indian households that depend 
on non-farm income belong to the lowest income category. 
 
18 Chanda (1993) found that the incidence of rural households seeking 
employment in the RNFE declines with the increase in farm size. 
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